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This thesis examines the origins and evolution of Western export controls intended 
to limit the transfer of high technology, particularly computers, to communist 
countries, and how technology policy within the Soviet Union and other communist 
states was shaped by these controls. This work intends to demonstrate that Western 
attempts to control trade in high technology were responsive to changing economic 
and political realities and that changes in export controls produced corresponding 
changes in policy within the USSR. Ultimately, policies on both sides served to 
maintain and widen the technology gap between East and West far more dramatically 
than anticipated, deepening the economic stagnation of Eastern Europe and hastening 
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 In 1996, when Carly Fiorina became CEO of Hewlett-Packard, the company 
enjoyed a decades-old reputation for engineering genius along with a comfortable 
market share. Fiorina has since become notorious in technology circles as someone 
who failed to see the big picture; in an effort to reduce company expenditures, she 
carved away mercilessly at what was by far its most expensive endeavor: research and 
development. Her decision quickly removed from the field what had been one of its 
most innovative and competitive players. Ultimately she sold off HP's research 




 The lessons of Soviet R&D are timely ones, and its example is still valid in 
demonstrating how important investment is in scientific advancement. Soviet science 
thrived in the late 1950s largely because it was among the most lucrative and 
prestigious professions in the communist world. By the early 1960s, the tremendous 
cost of domestic research made it a target for budgetary reductions, while the growing 
importance of applied research to economic success fostered increasing state 
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involvement in the sciences.
2
 At the same moment, the option of purchasing foreign 
licenses for high technology presented itself for the first time, and the Soviet Union 
was faced with a choice between its own struggling efforts to efficiently mass produce 
advanced technologies, or to purchase similar items from the West.
3
 The Soviet 
choice would be what historian Anne Fitzpatrick calls the ―Make-or-Take‖ Decision 
of 1967. Resolution No. 1180/420, passed by the Central Committee and Council of 
Ministers, made importation of foreign computers part of an ambitious plan to jump 
start computer production in the Soviet Union.
4
 By the time this resolution was 
passed, the technology gap in computing already made foreign models far superior to 
Soviet ones, and in the judgment of many well worth the time and cost to acquire 
them. In the process, however, a branch of research and industry containing some of 
the USSR's best minds, which had already struggled against ideological and practical 
obstacles, found much of its original work abandoned as the machinery of state 
science turned its efforts to reverse-engineering of Western models. Regardless of how 
unlikely Soviet domestic computing was to either catch up with or overtake the West, 
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the decision to tie Soviet progress to Western innovation would have dire economic, 
social and political consequences. 
 
 The costs of research and development on paper may appear to dwarf any 
immediate benefit, but the impact of curtailing that investment may ripple across all 
sectors and reverberate for decades into the future, resulting in an overwhelming loss 
of revenue and, in all likelihood, hastening the collapse of the entire enterprise. Martin 
Malia described the folly of central planning in its inability to reconcile the true wants 
and needs of the population with production as planners can only judge the needs of 
citizens based on what has already been produced.
5
 The same phenomena applied to 
scientific innovation; it could not be determined in advance what scientists would need 
to produce the next breakthrough, and so the economy was inherently ill-equipped to 
provide the material support researchers required. 
 The inability of the centrally-planned economy to foster and integrate 
technological advances in the USSR arguably has roots much deeper than the 
Revolution. A number of historians, economists, journalists and political theorists, 
among them David Saunders, Alexander Gerschenkron and Peter Amann, have 
claimed this as a pattern in the history of the region.
6
 For Gerschenkron, Russia's 
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technological lag itself was in a sense unique, an extension of the backwardness that 
had affected most of the region for centuries.
7
 Amann, however, cites the general 
difficulty societies face in making great leaps forward without subsequently taking 
great steps back, taking as an example the wild pendulum of the French Revolution 
and its corresponding fluctuations in social attitudes toward science, religion and 
morality.
8
 Despite its self-imposed economic, social and political distance from the 
West, the socialist world was hardly a system in isolation. It was profoundly affected 
by the external decisions of its adversaries as well as its allies, who were 
simultaneously experiencing their own cycles of reaction and reform. For many, the 
continuity between the historical reliance on foreign technology and the behavior of 
the USSR reflects much larger trends in the global economy, and cannot be ignored.
9
 
 Computers are the focus of this thesis because in many ways the field of 
computer science represents a microcosm of Soviet achievement and failure, and the 
differences in development between East and West. Socialism as a system profoundly 
failed some of its best scientific minds and its entire domestic computing industry. At 
its height during the late 1950s, the USSR represented a real challenge to Western 
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computing, both in technical and intellectual terms.
10
 However, the conditions of 
communism and a centrally-planned economy made progress difficult, and the wide-
scale, dynamic, market-driven development of computers that was to revolutionize the 
economies of the West impossible.  
 Computers were seen as a key strategic item, and were among the most tightly 
controlled by Western export restrictions.
11
 As the power and influence of computers 
became more apparent, their use as a tool in widening the technology gap between 
East and West was increasingly appreciated by Western policymakers. 
Simultaneously, their value and use was apparently profoundly misunderstood by 
those in socialist state planning circles, and mistrusted within the industrial leadership, 
rendering many costly investments in foreign technology meaningless.
12
 
 In researching the history of computing in the Soviet Union, and examining the 
changing relationship between East and West during the 1960s, a number of parts 
seemed to cohere as a continuous narrative. This thesis will attempt to relate in more 
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or less chronological order the political, scientific and social developments that 
allowed a technology gap between the socialist and capitalist worlds to form and 
grow. Eventually, this gap would contribute to the erosion of an ideological, political 
and economic system thought for decades to be immutable. However, at the opening 
of the 1960s, the USSR was at its scientific and political zenith. There was little reason 
to believe that a chain of decisions made within the USSR and abroad would begin the 
unraveling of a scientific superpower. The story of computing technology in the USSR 
encompasses most completely and elegantly the motivations behind and effects of 
these decisions. 
 The first chapter will deal with the political environment of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, and the scientific landscape within the USSR, particularly computing. 
The period here is treated as one of embryonic détente, in which the U.S. and USSR 
were perceived to have achieved scientific and military near-parity, and were forced to 
confront one another diplomatically for the first time. This period saw the groundwork 
laid for future foreign policy, including increased trade and future diplomatic 
engagement.  
 The second chapter will focus on the changing political and economic 
landscape in both the communist and capitalist worlds. A sharp increase in East-West 
trade begins to change the relationship between the U.S. and its allies, upon whom it 
relies to enforce export restrictions. Within the USSR, economic slowdown and 
political instability result in a number of restructuring and reform efforts, growing the 
Soviet bureaucracy while failing to produce desired results.  
7 
 
 The third chapter contains what this thesis holds to be a pivotal moment in 
Soviet history and in the relationship between East and West. The year 1967 saw 
tensions shift from Eastern Europe to China, and also witnessed the exhausted 
patience of American allies with what they saw as an absurdly restrictive technology 
export policy. On the Soviet side, an increasing acceptance of and demand for foreign 
technology as both a time and cost saving measure made the pursuit of foreign 
licenses irresistibly appealing. Within months of the U.S. relaxing its policy to allow 
licenses for low-performance computer production lines to Eastern Europe, the Soviet 
Council of Ministers voted to divert resources away from domestic computing 
research. It would instead focus on the acquisition of foreign licenses and hardware.
13
 
Almost immediately, an entire branch of Soviet science was hamstrung; the USSR had 
effectively made itself dependent on the West for innovations in the field of 
computing. 
  In examining this period, the picture that emerged was one of a two 
superpowers, acting somewhat blindly in their own self-interest, inevitably forced to 
deal with the ramifications of that status in relation to their allies. For the USSR, this 
meant moving from an economic model based on heavy industry to one more 
equipped to provide consumer goods, to build its wealth and the reputation of 
communism upon quality of life for its citizens and trade with the world.
14
 For the 
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United States, this meant learning to cooperate with allies it had become accustomed 
to dominating. Pressure from Western Europe ultimately caused the US to permit trade 
in computers with communist Eastern Europe. At roughly the same moment, the 
USSR began crafting state policy around the possibility of purchasing licenses from 
abroad rather than conducting costly domestic research and development.
15
 This thesis 
intends to demonstrate that, given the speed with which one decision followed upon 
the other, they constitute an interconnected chain of events. The changes that swiftly 
followed in the balance of global economic power following 1967 indicate that the 
USSR's decision to import foreign technology and abandon domestic R&D in 
computers was momentous. In addition to chaining Soviet progress to the whims of its 
adversaries, it indicated a crumbling of Soviet ideology, and an erosion of Soviet 
exceptionalism. In the estimation of former Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry and 
Academician Mikhail Sulim, ―I have to say that of the two possible paths of 




 Knowing (but only half accepting) the failures of its own system, the USSR 
had empowered its greatest enemy to restrain its technological development. 
Accepting (but never fully knowing) the Soviet Union's advanced technological 
capacity, the United States continued to push hard against technology transfer. What 
leniency COCOM showed in granting computing licenses to socialist countries 
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seemed to give the communist world enough rope to hang itself. At times, it appears 
US policymakers were either unaware or refused to believe how successful export 
controls had been in widening the technology gap.
17
  
 Among the primary sources consulted at the National Archives were the 
records of the State Department, Commerce Department, and Department of Defense. 
These agencies played major roles in the administration of international export 
controls among NATO nations and the members of the NATO-controlled 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). Various organs 
within the State Department and NATO, such as the Office of European Regional 
Political and Economic Affairs (EUR/RPE) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) sent representatives into the negotiations that 
determined which items were subject to embargo. Industries and agencies whose 
affairs were subject to export control scrutiny, specifically the nuclear, munitions and 
high technology fields, were also directly involved in policy negotiations. The CIA 
devoted significant resources to acquiring and translating reports on Soviet computing 
technology, and also on the participation of scientists from socialist states in 
international trade fairs and conferences.
18
 Unfortunately, the files pertaining to 
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technology exchange at the National Archives have been heavily redacted or 
reclassified within the past five years, and much information regarding the internal 
discourse shaping U.S. policy seems to be unavailable. 
  It was also a challenge to locate accessible materials in the State Archives of 
the Russian Federation. A number of other repositories that might have held useful 
information have been closed to Western researchers in recent years. It was possible, 
however, to consult the holdings of the Russian State Library.  
  
 Having been a prevailing concern for the United States government, literature 
on technology transfer and export controls in this period abounds from many sectors. 
Among the dominant historical voices speaking to the subject of Soviet Science, 
Nikolai Krementsov's exhaustive work on the structure of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences and the ideological war waged most visibly within Soviet biology during and 
after the Stalin era paint a vivid picture of the scientific system in the USSR as a 
whole, and the obligations and expectations carried by its members.
19
 Ethan Pollock's 
work in the same field gives important background to the various scientific 
controversies that shaped the practice and application of science in the Soviet Union.
20
 
The relationship between science and the Communist Party apparatus are treated more 
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closely in Stephen Fortescue's concise and effective work,
21
 as well as in Paul 
Josephson's research on science cities and scientific administration in the USSR.
22
 
Perhaps the greatest debt this paper owes regarding Soviet science and society belongs 
to Loren Graham, the veritable don of the history of Soviet science, who has couched 
a host of relevant topics within admirably readable and compelling prose. 
23
 
 Speaking to this topic on its most specific terms, Anne Fitzpatrick has done a 
much needed service in adding to the literature on the under-represented subject of 
computing in the USSR with her biographies of Soviet computing pioneers.
24
 Among 
the most notable historians of this subject, Slava Gerovitch reaches beyond his favored 
topic of cybernetics to provide valuable background on the material reality of 
computing in the USSR.
25
 Gerovitch also contributed to the singularly useful 
collection of essays, Computing in Russia: The History of Computing Devices and 
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Information Technology Revealed, which includes the writings of engineers Alexander 
Nitussov, Sergei Apokin, Friedrich Naumann, B.N. Malinofsky, and others.
26
 
  Since much of the most relevant literature on this topic departs from the field 
of history, a number of non-historical sources have proved the most useful. The 
writings of Dzherman Gvishiani, Soviet economic theorist and planner and Deputy 
Chairman of the Committee for Science and Technology of the Soviet Union (as well 
as Alexei Kosygin's son-in-law) were insightful in their repeated reference to Western 
studies on management and efficiency.
27
 They are also a testament to the fact that 
Western ideas on management and automation were present and circulating in the 
USSR, even if the means to implement them were not. Alec Nove's work on Soviet 
economics and science policy,
28
 and David Dyker's study of technology lag in the 
USSR and Eastern Europe demonstrate quantitatively the economic impact of the 
technology gap.
29
 R.E.H. Mellor's slim, accessible volume on COMECON helped 
elucidate an economic alliance that now seems a barely-comprehensible relic in 
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 David Dyker. Catching Up and Falling Behind: Post-Communist Transformation in Historical 





 William Taubman's Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of 
Khrushchev gives an account of perhaps the most influential personality of the Cold 
War, examining his influences and motivations, and giving an unprecedentedly 
detailed explanation of many of his seemingly inscrutable political and economic 
decisions.
31
 Charles Maier's work on the collapse of the East German state was useful 
in demonstrating the economic consequences of the events discussed on Eastern 
Europe, as the East German experience with technology transfers from the West 
reflects a broader Eastern European experience.
32
  
 This research attempts to take a broad view of the period in question including, 
to varying degrees, the perspectives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Western 
and Eastern Europe, and the political, economic and business interests within each. 
Marshall Goldman's Détente and Dollars: Doing Business With the Soviets presents a 
view of East-West trade that is both broad and deep, spanning many years and 
uncovering numerous useful details about the experience of Cold War-era trade with 
the USSR.
33
 Joseph Finder's colorful account of industrialists such as Armand 
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Hammer and Cyrus Eaton, who pioneered trade with the USSR in defiance of 
American public opinion, also reveals the experience of other Americans engaged in 
business with the USSR.
34
 Vladislav Zubok expertly narrates the political currents and 
events of the early 1960s and succeeds in making the tensions of that period almost 
palpable to the modern reader; a sense for the urgency which surrounded 
contemporary political and economic decisions is essential to understanding the 
climate in which these policies developed.
35
 However, the most oft-referred-to work 
encountered was certainly that of French journalist Michel Tatu, who apparently spent 
every waking moment between 1957 and 1968 compiling an exhaustive record of the 
Soviet press. His book, Power in the Kremlin; From Khrushchev to Kosygin, provides 
an almost unbroken linear account of the period drawn directly from Soviet 
newspapers and broadcasts, and was tremendously helpful in placing events in their 
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Soviet Science and Computing as a Discipline  
 
 Much research into the nature and practice of Soviet science has focused upon 
the academic structures within the Soviet Union, and the controversies that 
characterized them throughout much of the Stalin Era. Chief among these is Stalin's 
championing of Lysenko and Michurin's theories within the biological sciences, the 
promotion of which formalized rituals of self-criticism within the sciences, the 
lionization of a series of state-sanctioned ―Great Scientists,‖ and the possibility of 
rejecting certain disciplines as ―bourgeois‖.
37
  
 The latter had a tremendous impact upon the history of cybernetics, upon 
which historian Slava Gerovich has written extensively. He asserts that the the 
institutionalized self-criticism within the sciences encouraged many to reject 
cybernetics as bourgeois fallacy, to toss an entire branch of research under the bus, so 
to speak.
38
 Gerovitch describes computing as ―an interesting borderline case‖, caught 
between debates in physics where the goal was to ―overtake and surpass‖ Western 
capabilities, and in biology where the trend was to ―criticize and destroy.‖ ―Soviet 
computer specialists had to walk a fine line between two mortal dangers: falling 
behind the West in computing and following Western trends too closely.‖ Besides this, 
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strict boundaries between the disciplines were favored by Stalin and this served to 
block interdisciplinary cooperation and the sharing of ideas.
39 
 
 Cybernetics would later be rehabilitated, and eventually come into an 
astonishing scientific 'vogue' in the 1960s. ―Cybernetics became synonymous with 
computers, and computers synonymous with progress.‖
40
 The fate of cybernetics does 
not relate directly to the focus of this research, except perhaps in the sense that by the 
1960s, Soviet conceptions of what computers were and their role in society had 
diverged significantly from those of the West, at least on the levels of established 
research and production. The numerous cybernetics institutes that sprang up 
subsequently could develop theories regarding the power of computers, but the means 
of applied science and production had already been dedicated to different ends, largely 
military. Gerovitch cites an episode wherein the newly established Institute for 
Economic Cybernetics asked the Ministry of Defense to share access to a new network 
of computers. ―The reply was curt: ‗We are getting as much money for technological 
development as we ask for. You are getting nothing. If we cooperate, neither of us will 
get any money.‘‖
41
 This example serves to demonstrate both the disconnected nature 
of computing development, and the lack of committed financial support for 
development of computers beyond a certain narrow focus. 
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Contact and Trade with the West 
 
 While the scientific community beyond the Iron Curtain had developed into a 
global one, with steadily multiplying opportunities for interaction, Soviet scientists 
would become more isolated from one another as funding for collaboration dried up. 
However, among the most enthusiastically embraced aspects of the limited détente of 
the 1960s were scientific exchanges.
42
 As their advancements placed them at the 
forefront of innovation in many fields, Soviet scientists had more opportunities to 
communicate with their foreign peers than they had since the 1930s, even as 
opportunities for face-to-face communication and collaboration with their domestic 
colleagues contracted; professional conferences were slowly displaced by ideological 
seminars held for the benefit of scientists by institutional party organs.
43
 In many 
cases, these contacts would persist, and in some cases they would defy the political 
and economic conventions of their respective systems in the name of science.  
 Add to this mix the rising pressure of Western businessmen and political 
leaders who advocated for increased trade. NATO member nations of Western Europe 
had rarely expressed the profound distaste for Socialism on a national level that the 
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United States had shown during the 1950s, and there was growing dissatisfaction with 
the economic restrictions being enforced on it by an ally who seemed unconcerned 
with their sovereign national interests.
44
 These interests also found support among a 
growing number of Americans who were at least willing to consider the Socialist 
nations of Eastern Europe as something other than a direct threat.
45
 Whether they saw 
the Soviet Union's satellites as oppressed by a dictatorial regime and deserving of 
support, or merely as fertile markets for American goods, it became ever more 
difficult for hardliners in American politics to defend their unyielding position on 
trade, particularly in high technology. 
 
East-West Technology Transfer in the 1960s: Unprecedented and Unreliable  
 
 By virtue of increasing permissiveness in trade during the 1960s, socialist 
Eastern Europe was able to enjoy access to superior Western technology long enough 
for policy to be made on the assumption that such access would continue, and that 
they were moving toward ―a non-emergency type relationship‖.
46
 The fundamental 
flaws of the various centrally-planned economies ensured that their own domestic 
                                                          
 
44
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19 
 
research and development could never yield anything comparable in terms of 
computer production. Thus Eastern Europe found itself dependent on the West for 
innovations in computing. Yet the increasing access it enjoyed during one period 
might be subject to reversal in the next.  
 In a best-case scenario, it might take months or years to engineer a computer 
based off of an IBM model; given the unreliable status of licensing procedures on the 
part of COCOM and the unpredictable nature of socialist bureaucracy and production, 
the process might take years longer than intended.  
 Among the most common tenets of computing in the second half of the 20
th
 
century was Moore's Law, which posited that processor capacity would double every 
eighteen months.
47
 Among the greatest causes of delay for Soviet computing 
specialists was a delay in processing documentation, which included translation and, 
to some extent, censorship. In the late 1960s, it was estimated that the average time 
elapsed between receipt of foreign documentation and its release to the scientific 
community was eighteen months.
48
 Licensing review by COCOM might take several 
years, even for a machine already nearing obsolescence in the West. Beyond this 
delay, there was general difficulty in assessing the readiness of Soviet industry to 
absorb purchased technologies. According to one Soviet source: 
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 ―In some cases putting licenses to use is held up because of 
inadequate analysis of the capacities of domestic industry. One cause of 
the slow incorporation of licenses lies in the fact that production 
preparations are not started immediately after the conclusion of the 
license agreement, but only after the entire volume of technical and 
technological documents has been received. This inevitably leads to a 





 In the time it took for a Soviet institution to apply for and receive a license, 
conclude a business agreement, receive and translate all associated documentation, 
implement and integrate the machine with a combination of incompatible domestic 
technologies, and perhaps also overcome internal resistance to the license or the 
computer itself, the capacity of Western machines had doubled at least four times. And 
that would be four times over the most cutting edge computer available when the 
license was first sought; the actual computing power any machine likely to be licensed 
to a Socialist country would be many times less. At any stage in these negotiations, an 
external diplomatic crisis might derail years of effort. Still, purchase of foreign 
hardware, licenses and production lines was attractive enough that an ever-increasing 
portion of the Soviet economy would be dedicated to this end. These factors allowed 
the Soviet Union's technological disadvantage to grow exponentially throughout the 
1960s and into the 1980s. 
 The systemic inability of the Soviet Union to either support domestic 
innovation and apply it to production, or effectively adopt and implement foreign 
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innovations within its economy left the USSR on the south edge of an ever-widening 
technology gap. The combination of Western export controls and socialist technology 
policy had the effect of making the technological gap between capitalist and 
communist societies spread wider and faster than many had feared or imagined. 
 
The Postwar Period and the Origins of Western Export Controls 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the Soviet Union advanced upon Eastern 
Europe, establishing a series of socialist satellite governments among the ruins of Nazi 
retreat. The USSR also established economic dominion over the region, either by 
establishing Soviet-controlled joint operations or by appropriating means of 
production and transporting them wholesale deep into the Eurasian interior.
50
 It soon 
became clear that the Soviet Union's domination of the region would not soon pass, 
and that what Stalin demanded amounted to more than a buffer region against future 
German aggression. By 1949, seven socialist states had been declared in Eastern 
Europe, states which the USSR would largely politically and economically dominate 
for the next forty years. 
 The divide between Western and Eastern Europe was made more 
economically concrete by the implementation of the Marshall Plan, and the birth of 
the Common Market in the capitalist West. Stalin was prepared to violently resist 
efforts by the new Eastern European satellites to sign on to the Marshall Plan, 
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instead subsidizing their socialist economies with Soviet raw materials and, to 
some extent, scarce finished goods.
51
 The Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (known as COMECON in the West, or as CMEA in English-language 
documentation originating from within Eastern Europe) was established in 1949 as 
a response to the Marshall Plan and the foundation of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation. From its founding until the late 1950s, 
COMECON would exist largely on paper, and have little administrative reality 
aside from the memo which created it. That situation would change dramatically in 
subsequent years, but until the mid-1950s, the USSR exerted primary control over 
the economies of Eastern Europe. 
 The period from the late 1940s through the Korean War brought ever-
tightening trade restrictions between East and West. The Iron Curtain drew tight 
around the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in Stalin's final years, a period of 
profound isolation for the USSR and its satellites. The Berlin Crisis of 1948 had 
pushed the US and Soviet Union to the brink of war, and Soviet acquisition of the 
atomic bomb in 1949 raised a terrifying new prospect for international conflict. 
War plans were drawn up on three and six month scales throughout the late 1940s 
until the mid-1950s. Strict export controls were to be arranged and enforced 
between NATO member nations. War, most likely nuclear war, seemed inevitable 
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and trade, any trade, with the Soviet Union seemed a dangerous gamble.52 East-
West trade almost entirely disappeared over the course of the Korean conflict.  
 Strict export controls were to be arranged and enforced between NATO 
member nations. From the beginning, it was clear that the United States expected 
compliance with its judgments regarding export licenses from its European allies. 
During the post-war WWII years, the United States had little interest in supporting 
trade with the socialist world, and a great deal of interest in discouraging the 
same.53 However, this arrangement was naturally to become strained as the 
economies of Western Europe recovered and wished to take advantage of 
contiguous Eastern markets, whether socialist or not. 
 
 The Export Control Act of 1949 strictly limited trade with communist 
countries after the Soviet takeover of the Eastern bloc. In response to the lack of 
resolution over Berlin, and the escalating Korean Crisis, in 1951 the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Control Act was passed. It gave the president power to revoke 
any and all aid given to countries that sent restricted goods to countries under 
embargo. This policy of economic warfare was enacted to ensure the slow growth 
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of Soviet economic power.
54 
In 1951, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls (COCOM) established to enforce export restrictions. This would be 
the organ of Western approval for trade with the Socialist world for the remainder of 
the Cold War. COCOM lives on today in a similar agreement known as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, whose members agree to restrict trade in strategic technology and 
materials.  
 
 The Export Control Act was an accompany piece to the Marshall Plan, and 
granted authority to the President of the United States to determine which exports 
from the US should be subject to embargo. The president delegated the functions of 
the Export Control Act to the Department of Commerce, specifically the Office of 
Export Control within its Bureau of Foreign Commerce.
55
 The level of restriction for 
a given item was indicated in the Commodity Control List, which indicated what type 




 The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act created the legal frameworth 
through which NATO allies, at the request of the Unites States, could jointly enforce 
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export controls. COCOM existed to review and license exports from NATO member 
states to communist countries. The functions of COCOM were expanded significantly 
during the Korean War. Fifteen member nations, including all the NATO member 
nations except Iceland and with the addition of Japan, agreed to abide by the strict 
licensing procedures required by COCOM when considering exports of potentially 
strategic goods to communist states. COCOM made its decisions by maintaining a 
secret, internationally approved list of controlled items. 
 Items were grouped into various categories under the COCOM restrictions, and 
subject to five possible levels of control. Among the most salient questions applied 
was the possibility of ―dual use‖; could an item with a civilian, non-strategic function 
also be used for military purposes? This was a litmus test nearly all computers would 
fail. Items declared to have dual-usage, including most computers, would be found on 
the International List, meaning that review was required for all potential sales to 
proscribed destinations. One of the characteristics that could relegate an item to the 
International List was the existence or potential of a strategic technology gap. The 
International List requirements clearly state that an item is subject to control and 
review if ―proscribed nations have a deficiency that hinder development or production 
of arms, ammunitions, or military systems, a deficiency they are not likely to 
overcome within a reasonable period.‖
57
 Not only did the COCOM International List 
identify as a specific goal the fostering of technology lag in embargoed nations, but 
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provided highly effective tools for the purposeful monitoring and expansion of the 
technology gap. 
 Devices with a widely varying degree of sophistication, such as computers 
(category no. 1565) might then be subject to varying levels of control.
58
 Items under 
―General Embargo‖ required a unanimous vote from the member nations before an 
export license was granted. ―Favorable consideration‖ indicated the item would likely 
be cleared pending deliberations and provided certain conditions were met. ―One time 
review‖ or the ―45-day procedure‖ meant that determinations needed to be made as to 
what category the item belonged to and the level of control applied. Items cleared at 
this level would henceforth be permitted for sale, either with no restrictions or under 
the ―Administrative Exception Note‖ level of control, which dispensed with future 
COCOM review for licenses provided monthly statistics on items exported were 
submitted to the Committee. The fifth level of control was ―Notification‖, under which 
no review by COCOM was required, but the Committee received 30 days‘ notice of 
the sale before shipment.
59
 Non-strategic items cleared for trade were granted a 
―general license‖; items requiring review were issued a ―validated license‖, and it was 
for these licenses that were most hotly debated. The U.S. Department of Commerce 
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 The United States and other countries were permitted to export items at their 
own discretion under COCOM's ―Administrative Exception Note‖, but disagreements 
regarding the level of control that should be applied to new items caused tension 
among COCOM's member nations.
61
 Applications from U.S. companies for sales of 
advanced technology to communist countries were subject to review by the 
Department of Defense, and licenses were issued by the Department of Commerce. 
While small, low-capacity computers might be licensed with minimal review, 
medium or high-capacity computers were categorically denied.
62
 Through the 
Department of Commerce, the U.S. could also put pressure on its allies to comply 
by scrutinizing the export of U.S.-produced components used in their models.
63
 
Thus the U.S. held a substantially greater share of power over COCOM than any of 
its individual member nations, and thus if COCOM would be swayed, the U.S. had 
to be convinced that licensing the transfer of technology was in its interests. How 
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dangerous, how strategic were the computers coming up for licensing? What was the 
threat they posed in Communist hands? On these questions the U.S. was apt to take a 
significantly more conservative position on this question than its Western allies.
64
 
 In the early 1960s, the U.S. Department of Commerce maintained an embargo 
list of over 1,000 strategic items, and restrictions were only made tighter by 
amendments to the Export Control Act in 1962.
65
 However, as the Cold War reached 
its hottest point and export controls received greater scrutiny, the economies of 
Western Europe began to lose their postwar dependency on the United States. The 
USSR and other socialist countries promised to make trade in technology very 
lucrative for Western countries, and American corporations were beginning to put 





 East-West trade has been used to describe both trade from the United States to 
the USSR and its satellites, but the term also applies to collective trade between the 
US along with its Western European allies (particularly NATO member states), and 
the USSR and Eastern Europe nations. Yugoslavia was often excluded from definition 
as an ―Eastern Bloc‖ nation because its historically antagonistic political relationship 
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 Export controls left the socialist world at more than a military and strategic 
disadvantage. The existence of internal industrial standards unique to COMECON 
countries often resulted in production standards well below those of the West.
68
 The 
inability to either develop or import the technological means to improve their 
infrastructure or production capacity meant that Eastern Europe became trapped in a 
cycle where increasingly poor sources of raw materials had to be exploited to support 
production of poor-quality items that failed quickly or soon needed to be replaced. 
Improvements to factory production lines, integration of power grids, and assessments 
of natural resources were stalled. Eastern European states sold off the subsidized 
petroleum they received from the USSR for desperately needed hard currency, burning 




 The idea of an East-West gradient in terms of culture and technology is a 
deeply-ingrained one, and continues to affect perceptions between countries today.  
The idea that the Soviet Union might suddenly appear to have surpassed the West in 
rocketry and space science was shocking and troubling on many levels, not in the least 
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because the US had apparently underestimated its chief adversary. The secrecy that 
shrouded many Soviet programs would keep the West on edge for years, leaving the 
true state of affairs obscured until a great deal of Western foreign policy assumed near 
technological parity. Decades later, many American policymakers would refuse to 
believe the Soviet Union had, in fact, fallen so far behind. Western accounts of Soviet 
technological capacity from the 1950s onward frequently overestimated its ―quality 
and complexity‖, placing it on equal footing with the West and ignoring the larger 
Soviet economic reality.
70
 Both the loosening and the tightening of export controls 
seemed to serve to widen the technological gap to an extent that few on either side 
fully appreciated until fairly late. Thus the US and its allies maintained intense 
pressure through export controls right up until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
71   
 Leadership within the United States also underestimated the lengths to which 
its allies would go to defend their own sovereign interests. In a very real sense, it 
failed to see the impression its resistance to their demands was making. However, 
when faced with the implosion of the entire NATO export control structure, the US 
conceded to revise the embargo lists.
72
 Within a year of the US conceding to the sale 
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of a French computer to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union altered its own technology 
policy to abandon many domestic efforts and instead focus on foreign models obtained 
through connections with Eastern Europe. 
  The Soviet bid to reverse-engineer legitimately acquired technology from the 
West was part of a massive effort to transform its centrally-planned economy through 
automation. Working backwards from Western models was intended to be a fast-track, 
money-saving approach. Unfortunately, the very structure of the economy at its most 
fundamental levels kept this process from proceeding in a timely manner or producing 
anything resembling the desired results.  
 The access that Soviet allies within COMECON enjoyed proved unreliable, 
and technology exchange often fell victim to wider political and social upheavals. 
What was offered in a transient moment of détente might soon become unavailable, 
and once the socialist world began to look to the West for innovations, it could no 
longer recover any kind of parity in its own domestic research. The costs rose higher, 
and the gap yawned wider, as the West learned to take advantage of its position, and 
the East sacrificed ever more dearly to acquire long-obsolete technologies.
73
 
 The example of computer imports and the enforcement and exploitation of 
export controls by both sides in the Cold War reflects a cycle of reaction and reform. 
The Soviet Union saw access to Western exports increase during periods of détente, 
and altered their domestic policies to reflect the promise of continued access. It 
permitted its allies to cultivate relationships with the West under the premise that 
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innovations would be more readily shared with them than with the USSR itself. A 
loosened its grip on Eastern Europe soon became an uncomfortable loss of control for 
the USSR, resulting in the violent reactionary response of the Prague Spring. 
However, the new economic reality of technological dependence on the West meant 
that such responses in the future would have dangerous domestic repercussions, both 
economically and socially. The assumption that access to foreign computers would 
continue unabated was flawed, and trapped socialist economies in a loop that robbed 
them of more scientific, economic and political autonomy with each cycle.  
 Proxy struggles in the underdeveloped world would require not only a 
commitment of military resources from the USSR, but came with serious costs in 
trade. Technology transfer would become more important than ever as a tool the West 
could leverage. Each hostile action, or return to reactionary, isolationist policies would 
set the Soviet Union further behind as the US and its allies could easily deny 
applications for the exchange of high technology. With little entirely domestic 
research to fall back on, the USSR would simply have to wait for, or cultivate, détente 
in order to reach its production goals for computers. These goals, it should be noted, 
were modest compared to Western production, and were seldom reached.
74
 
 It is often asserted that much of the technology the Soviet Union developed 
during the last twenty-five years of its existence was stolen; while it is true that some 
portion of its capacity was acquired by illicit means, this accounts for a fraction of the 
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expense and energy which went into the legitimate acquisition of computing hardware 
and production lines. These computers were often stripped to a minimum of their 
original capacity, and at times even came with human ―minders‖, among others in a 
long parade of concessions.
75
 
 By allowing itself to become reliant on the West for the latest innovations in 
computing, the socialist world submitted itself to monitoring by its political 
adversaries, and allowed its progress to be determined at the will of its alleged 
enemies. This act admitted as clearly as any purge that the USSR saw its best minds as 
expendable. Its institutions, policies and practices could not produce the reforms 
needed for material support of innovation. Not only this, but the freedom of thought 
necessary for innovation was in practice deemed too dangerous to be granted, even if 
this were the socialist world's only hope. Regardless of what Soviet minds might have 
produced, the vast bureaucracy and atomized social climate that both pervaded and 
surrounded the scientific community prevented the kinds of collaboration that drove 
research and absorption of innovation in the West. The failure of Soviet computing 
was not in its intellect, but in the skewed perception of scientific progress that drove 
the entire system surrounding it. The linear model embraced by those at the highest 
levels within the Soviet Union did not allow for the kinds of indirect associations and 
trial and error that drove innovation in the West. Adherence to this model made the 
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idea of purchasing innovation, accessing scientific advancement at the midpoint rather 
than the beginning, both feasible and desirable in terms of policy. Within a short 
period, a number of communist countries made purchase of technology from the West 
a prominent priority. In the process, these socialist states altered their ideologies, raped 
their environments, and mortgaged their futures, leading to a long period of stagnation 
and decline, and communism's ultimate collapse.  
It is often asserted that much of the technology the Soviet Union developed 
during the last twenty-five years of its existence was stolen; while it is true that some 
portion of its capacity was acquired by illicit means, this accounted for a fraction of 
the expense and energy which went into the legitimate acquisition of computing 
hardware and production lines. These legitimately-acquired computers were often 
stripped to a minimum of their original capacity, and at times even came with human 
―minders‖, among others in a long parade of concessions.
76
 
 After 1967, the communist world more and more resembled a system that no 
longer believed in itself. The ideological will that had vaulted the country forward in 
the past would henceforth ring hollow, and the shambling economy would only 
provide mounting evidence of the Party's disregard for the minds and bodies of the 
people it claimed to represent. Vast sums (not easily quantifiable due to the nature of 
Soviet economic data and the secretive nature of many contracts) were diverted from 
domestic works each year and poured into obtaining computers that would do little to 
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improve the security or well-being of ordinary citizens. The Soviets did not steal this 
























Détente, Reform, and Technology in the Post-postwar World 
 
A Foundation for Increasing Exchange with the West 
 
―The dynamism of forward movement must be met by more than 
intellectual sentry duty. If we could provide a hope and a goal instead 
of trying merely to hold what we possess we could have a much more 
positive appeal, one which might have some effect on Khrushchev's 
grandchildren.‖ 
 -‖Planning Paper on European Unity‖, September 5, 1961
77 
 
 In the late 1950s, the USSR somewhat unexpectedly presented a 
scientific and military challenge to the United States. For the first time, the two 
superpowers were perceived to have achieved a kind of parity. In addition, both had 
strong, popular leadership in place, leadership which had indicated a desire and 
willingness to diffuse the tensions between them.
78 
Eisenhower and Khrushchev both 
enjoyed support at home, and could entertain the possibility of negotiations from a 
position of relative strength.
79
 An unprecedented, though short-lived, improvement in 
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Richard Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Detente. (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 




relations between the United States and the USSR took place as the decade drew to a 
close. However briefly, within this period the two powers began to develop the 
foundation of for future diplomatic relations.
80
  
Among the drivers of this early détente was the scientific ascendancy of the 
Soviet Union. The surprise launch of Sputnik caught Americans off guard, and the 
relative success of Soviet space exploration efforts (concurrent with a string of 
American disasters) engendered a widespread belief that the Soviet Union was or 
would soon be scientifically superior. In early 1959, a Gallup poll revealed that 43% 
of Americans believed that the Soviet Union would hold the leading position in 
science ten years in the future; only 13% believed that technological dominance would 
belong to the US.
81
 Another Gallup poll in the same period showed that 34% of 
Americans believed the US was dropping behind the USSR in terms of military 
power, while only 25% believed we were still ahead.
82 
Not only did the Soviet Union 
need to be taken seriously as a military threat to the continental United States, but it 
had issued a virtual mandate for American science and policy to rise to the challenge. 
In the spring of 1959, the Council of Ministers met in Geneva in hopes of 
easing tensions in Berlin. The conference was inconclusive, but did produce a 
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remarkable thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, including a promised exchange of visits by 
their respective leaders. Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, said of Geneva, 
―When we look back upon the story of the last few months we realize how great an 
advance there has been. Last November we were talking in terms of threats and 
ultimata. Now we are talking in terms of personal visits and discussions.‖
83
 In 1959, 
Nikita Khrushchev became the first Soviet General Secretary to visit the United States 
in peacetime. The amicable nature of his visit represented tremendous progress in 
relations between the two nations. The importance of this meeting, and the 
possibilities it presented were not lost on the public at large; a 1959 Gallup poll rated 
the meeting of Khrushchev and Eisenhower the most important event of the previous 





 Another important development during the late 1950s was a changing attitude 
towards trade and exchange with the Soviet Union and its satellites. By 1959, 55 
percent of Americans thought that the US and USSR should buy and sell more goods 
to one another, compared with 27 percent who opposed increased trade.
85
 The Soviets 
often had significant motivation to seek increased trade, yet these practical 
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motivations were often inextricably bound up in political and ideological ones. 
Western businesses not only found their efforts to trade with socialist nations 
hampered by strict embargoes and incongruous currencies, but also by a series of 
complex and inflexible bureaucratic organs. On the socialist side, a political agenda 
seemed apparent at every phase and level, from visa office to permit office, and from 
factory to shipping yard.
86
  Little recourse was available to Western businesses if they 




Beyond this was the constant, and typically confirmed, suspicion that the 
Soviets harbored ulterior motives. In the early 1950s, a recurring scenario occurred in 
which the Soviet Union opened a dialogue on trade for non-strategic items only to 
reveal its true desire for raw materials or goods under embargo. This pattern 
encouraged a prevailing logic in the US that trade with the Soviets, along with being 
morally offensive, would be futile. Western Europe, however, was already pressing for 
greater trade, even though it often came at a price.
88
 A 1953 Time magazine article 
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encouraged revision of the Embargo List, if only to cure a deluded Europe of the urge 
to trade with the communists: ―Despite all the pitfalls of trade with Russia, the clamor 
for it by European businessmen who are being shut out of the U.S. market will 
probably increase. To lessen it, the U.S. will have to revise its list of strategic goods, 
try to eliminate all the borderline products whose export must be approved by a 
NATO-wide committee in Paris. If the list were more precise, a needless source of 
anti-American irritation would be removed, and more European businessmen could 
learn firsthand the Soviet shell game.‖ 
89
 
Trade with socialist countries would continue to be a political and business 
gamble for the West, but after death of Stalin, the status quo was continually 
challenged by both sides. The 1955 Geneva Summit saw the first signs of easing 
tensions between the two. Both President Eisenhower and CIA chief John Foster 
Dulles saw trade as a potential diplomatic tool, and looked to reduce restrictions on 
East-West trade.
90
 The grip of the USSR on its satellites in Eastern Europe began to 
loosen, especially after new Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 ―Secret 
Speech‖. Beyond its veiled condemnation of Stalin's ―cult of personality‖, 
Khrushchev's speech allowed for individual interpretations of socialist doctrine, 
sparking a wave of resistance to Soviet authority in the Eastern Bloc.
91
 However, the 











Eastern Bloc countries' efforts to assert their sovereignty were sharply curtailed once 
such independence threatened Soviet influence. Violent repression of the Hungarian 
uprising that year demonstrated how narrow the limits of still were. However, once set 
in motion, the steady drift of the satellite states, their demonstrated resistance to Soviet 
authority, and their status as unwilling thralls to Soviet power made them not only 




By the mid-1950s, however, proponents of détente on both sides saw 
promise in the idea of more open trade. Even before the rise of Khrushchev and the 
subsequent shift in mutual perceptions that preceded the first détente, trade was 
seen by some as a tool to normalize relations between the two powers. The US 
Chamber of Commerce itself was in favor of increasing East-West trade, supported 
by a number of American businesses and industries, which began petitioning for 
the right to sell to Soviets.
93
 Policies to deal with such pressures would be required 
alongside a cohesive foreign policy. 
While COCOM rules had governed exports for the past decade, as more 
incentive to trade with the Soviets and other socialist states accumulated, it was 
clear that greater specificity and publicity regarding export restrictions would be 
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needed. The US State Department and the Bureau of Foreign Commerce within the 
Department of commerce outlined the US Export Control Program in a 1960 
pamphlet.
94
 The Bureau of Foreign Commerce was to be responsible for the 
controlled sale of all but a few specified items. Atomic energy and equipment 
would be overseen by the Atomic Energy Commission, while arms, munitions and 
other implements of war (including helium) would be the responsibility of the 
State Department. The term ―implements of war‖ invites broad interpretation, and 
left all potentially strategic items within the State Department's purview. 
Two supplementary laws governed the administration of the export control 
system within the US. The Administrative Procedures Act required that regulations 
and subsequent changes issued under the Export Control Act be disclosed to the 
Public. The Federal Reports Act made all regulations requiring information or 
reports from ten or more persons, ―including those required from exporters in 
connection with export licenses, must be reviewed and approved by the Bureau of 
the Budget.‖
95
 Since the Bureau of the Budget resides within the Executive branch, 
this provided another way in which Presidential authority was extended over 
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export controls. Export controls, and the administration thereof, could be greatly 
affected by the attitudes present within the current administration. 
Coupled with the growing demand for foreign technology within the Soviet 
Union, changes to the Export Control Program allowed for a rapid expansion of 
trade. Between 1957 and 1964, East-West trade had nearly doubled.
96
 Granted, a 
doubling of the small amount of trade that had existed prior to this period still 
accounted for only a tiny portion of the U.S. Imports or exports, but the potential 
profits were dwarfed by the political significance of this trend. Trade with the 
USSR had powerful adversaries within government. Senator Karl Mundt, a 
Republican from Montana, proposed several pieces of legislation in the 1960s that 
would have barred the extension of credit from the Import-Export Bank to 
communist countries for purchases of American commodities; this legislation 
cleared the house but failed in the Senate.
97
 Given the unpredictable political 
climate in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the effectiveness of export 
controls, and whether to eliminate export controls entirely or expand and extend 
them indefinitely was open to debate. 
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 Shortly before his assassination, John F. Kennedy wrote to the Export Control 
Review board regarding recent developments in East-West trade and relations with the 
following questions: 
―1. Do we now deal with the Soviet Union on the export of 
technically advanced machinery and equipment in a manner which 
adequately protects U.S. interests? Where a national security issue is 
presented, we of course deny an export license. There are, however, 
many cases in which no clear security issue arises and yet we know that 
the Soviets are using American machinery and equipment as a basis for 
copying our technology. Are we being adequately compensated in these 
sales?  
 
 2. Is there any method of organizing these transactions which 
would secure a better quid pro quo than the present method of leaving it 
to the individual seller to secure the best price he can in the transaction, 
in the light of the fact the Soviet Union does not ordinarily respect the 
patent and copyright arrangements on which we rely in our commercial 
transactions with other nations?  
 
3. Should we reconsider the whole of our trade with the Soviet 
Union in the light of trade between Western Europe and the Soviet 
Union and its European satellites? Considering the character and 
volume of that trade, would a generally less restrictive policy be more 
in keeping with the interests of the United States? How much 
possibility is there for a significant broadening of trade that is 
consistent with our security interests? Would this possibility be such as 
to justify a general negotiation on trade and commercial matters with 




 The response issued later that summer by the State Department's Policy 
Planning council responded to the President's concerns by downplaying the potential 
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impact of increasing trade or reducing export controls for the USSR, but granted that 
easing restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe might prove far more strategic: 
 ―The prospects for influencing Soviet policies, at least for the nearer term, 
would be modest at best; but they could be of very considerable significance in the 
case of the Satellites. We have good reason to believe that the forces now making for 
unrest and change in Eastern Europe will mount. The ability to use trade flexibly and 
actively in Eastern Europe would add greatly to the presently limited capacity of the 
U.S. to shape the course of these events. In any case, from the point of view of dealing 
with either the USSR or the Satellites, we would surely be in a stronger position if 
trade were active (and thus subject to change) than if it was virtually stagnant (and 




Another memorandum in this series responding to the President's question, this 
time from the Export Control Review Board on Aug. 15, 1963, proposes ―a discussion 
with our Allies of the implications that a change in U.S. policy would have on the 
multilateral system of controls and the possible need we may face to modify its overtly 
discriminatory form without damage to our ability to maintain collective surveillance 
and the control of strategic commodities as multilaterally defined.‖
100
 This suggestion 
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was subsequently dismissed the following month by the National Security Council, 
which believed current controls had been liberalized more than enough.
101
 Since 
COCOM was administered through American agencies, and export controls were 
under the auspices of the Executive Branch, no review could be called without internal 
agreement within the United States.
102
 
 Kennedy himself declined to press for a review of the COCOM lists in 1963, 
but stressed that he was ―strongly in favor of pressing forward more energetically than 
this report and its recommendations imply, in our trade with the Soviet and Eastern 
Bloc.‖ On September 19
th
, Kennedy wrote, ―In the light of the rapidly changing 
conditions in Eastern Europe, Export Control Review Board should prepare guidelines 
for a less restrictive, step-by-step expansion in trade with individual nations of Eastern 
Europe, within the present legal structure.‖
103
 Two months later, Kennedy was gone, 
but Lyndon Johnson continued to press for trade with the Eastern Bloc.  
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Soviet Science and Computing 
 
―The history of computers in the Soviet Union is a graphic 
example of the failure of that country to blaze an independent path, 
another case of the erosion of Soviet exceptionalism.‖  
 
– Loren Graham, What Have We Learned About Science and 




 During the postwar period, the USSR offered scientists a number of financial 
and other incentives to conduct and share their research. Premiums and prizes were 
awarded at an increasing number of domestic conferences, providing scientists with 
rare and vital opportunities to travel and meet with others in their field. Honoraria 
were given to those who published regularly, or prepared descriptions of their work 
for laymen and those outside their field.
105
  
 Science was not only highly regarded in Soviet society, but relatively lucrative, 
and scientists were materially rewarded in much the same way that highly productive 
workers in other fields were. A true 'scientific Stakhanovite' would not only be well-
respected by his peers and neighbors, but enjoy prosperity in keeping with his 
diligence in promoting Soviet science. During the Stalin era, scientific administration 
under the Academy of Sciences combined basic and applied research. The Academy 









of Science heavily favored basic research over applied; basic research would account 
for a majority of projects, and the Academy would continue to support this even while 
political pressure for more applied research increased.
106
  
World War II saw many theoreticians and laboratory scientists transfer their 
skills to applied science and technology for the war effort. The advancement they 
achieved in wartime forever altered the role of Soviet scientists; the wartime practice 
of sending brigades of scientists to solve practical problems continued until Stalin's 
death.
107
 The effectiveness of these science brigades made more direct government 
involvement in research difficult to resist.
108
 
By giving such incentives, the USSR promoted the active work and interaction 
of its best minds. For several decades, they had imported and adapted technology from 
abroad in metallurgy, refining and heavy industry, seldom innovating but often 
improving upon foreign models.
109
 With an infusion of military resources both foreign 
and domestic over the previous decade, by the 1950s the Soviets presented a true 
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technological challenge to the West in many fields.
110
 Among these was computer 




 The structure of Soviet science was nonetheless not conducive to computing 
research, and would only become less so with time. Economist Marshall Goldman 
cites the inflexible nature of Soviet economic planning; ―Some of the blame must be 
shouldered by the rather inflexible Soviet planning system, with its traditional 
emphasis on increasing the quantity of output...Such a system, however, provides 
planners and managers with little incentive to innovate or experiment with technology. 
Any interruption of the production line in order to experiment with new products or 
production methods risks underfulfillment of the all-important quantitative production 
goals.‖
112 
Also diminishing was the financial incentive for scientists to share their work, 
and funding for travel and conferences. In September of 1962, G.N. Petelin issued a 
report signed by himself and the other heads of the Profsoyuz to the Central 
Committee on how the agency intended to respond to new policies of fiscal restraint 
that accompanied recent bureaucratic restructuring by cutting back its budget. Among 
the cost-saving measures Petelin's commission advocated were reducing the number of 
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members of participants in scientific conferences, lowering fees paid for lectures at 
scientific conferences by 80%, dispensing with the practice of paying judges for juried 
competitions in the sciences, limiting extended study tours and cutting back on 
honorariums provided to scientists who published brochures and other writings 
sharing their experiences.
113
 Opportunities for communication and financial incentives 
for sharing information and resources suddenly contracted at the same time as the 
USSR desperately sought ways to improve the interconnections between research and 
practice. Besides this, the shifting of a surprisingly large percentage of the population 
into engineering professions resulting in a leveling of wages; by the 1970s, many 
engineers in fields such as construction would earn less than laborers.
114
 
 While the USSR achieved great success in the production of raw materials and 
heavy industrial goods, its ability to reliably produce innovative technology had 
seldom been able to keep pace. Scientific research and development might yield 
advances that globally were on the cutting edge, but production on any scale 
inevitably suffered from chronic problems. In 1965, Peter Kapitsa, an influential 
scientist and director of the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of 
Scientists lamented (in an official report to the Academy), that ―The assimilation of 
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 Since the 1930s, Soviet planners had looked towards a future when 
automation would facilitate the precise administration of the Soviet economy, 
allowing them to gauge production capacities and demand levels with great 
precision.
116
 However, central planning itself hindered the development of reliable 
computers for large-scale production and use.  
 Many areas of Soviet industry suffered from problems related to the 
adequate supply of replacement parts. Among the greatest challenges to central 
planning was the accurate estimation of resources for machinery maintenance. 
Specialized parts were especially problematic and prone to failure. In 1966, Soviet 
televisions had a mean-time-to-failure average of 500 hours due to faulty vacuum 
tubes.
117 
In the case of machine lathes, a 1971 issue of Pravda noted that ―The 
system of capital repairs...with inadequate development of a centralized production 
of spare parts has led to the creation of a large and little-specialized repair 
industry...This ―second machine-construction industry‖ is occupied in reality with 
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the reproduction of obsolete equipment.‖
118
 Such workarounds were apparently a 
necessity in many Soviet industries, but were not feasible for the kinds of 
specialized components required for computers.  
Soviet self-criticism on this subject sought to spur reforms, but the 
problems associated with potential solutions were not only myriad, they were also 
cyclical. ―Control computers must solve the problems given to them within a given 
time. However, the reliability of contemporary computers as things stand now is 
too low to meet this requirement.‖
119
 The problems associated with producing 
effective computers domestically could not be solved without them, a conundrum 
that would haunt Socialist economists for decades. According to computing 
pioneer B.N. Malinovskiy, ―Experts were often invited to share their opinions with 




 Two of the most advanced computing systems ever produced by Soviet 
domestic research, the BESM (Bol'shaia Elektronicheskaia Schetnaia Mashina, or 
―Large Electronic Calculating Machine‖), and the MESM (Malaia 
Elektronicheskaia Schetnaia Mashina, or ―Small Electronic Computing Machine‖) 
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were produced in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and represented a major 
international achievement in computing. However, these machines were plagued 
by the same problems that affected nearly all industries and subsequent computer 
designs. Replacement parts could not be reliably produced, and so few attempts 
were made to operate the machine at full capacity either in testing or actual use. 
Practices adopted to conserve the fragile parts resulted in a ―dumbed down‖ 
machine that could not operate as effectively as it had been designed. While the 
MESM was the first computer to implement the principle of parallel processing, its 
designers disabled these functions of the machine and omitted circuits for reasons 
of economy, cutting its performance drastically. 
121
 It was simply too costly to risk 
damaging the limited number of switches available. The BESM and similar 





Soviet attitudes and ideologies regarding computing, including entire 
branches of theory, also determined the course of computer science research in the 
USSR. The ideological crusade against cybernetics in the early 1950s is sometimes 
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blamed for the subsequent lag in Soviet computing. However, the backlash may 
have been more of a symptom than a cause; after Stalin denounced the new idea of 
cybernetics as ―bourgeois‖ science, a number of voices within the field of 
computing joined in discrediting it. Years later, some would recall that this was 
part of the ritual of scientific self-criticism, and described the blacklisting of 





Soviet computer science continued to develop at the same pace as the West 
in some areas for many years afterward, and in some fields, such as the 
mathematics of complex computing algorithms, the USSR never fell behind at 
all.
124
 However, the blacklisting of cybernetics as a branch of computing kept 
researchers from seriously considering modeling of natural or social phenomena, 
including economic concepts such as consumption patterns and management 
theories. With less focus given to studying the ways computers might help manage 
a society, economic planners in the Soviet Union were unable to foresee the myriad 
ways in which computers might be applied.
125
 ―As a result, the digital computer 
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was initially conceptualized in the Soviet Union as a giant calculator and stripped 
of all cybernetic metaphors.‖
126
  
Cybernetics would later be rehabilitated and come into vogue in the USSR, 
but in the West much important ground had been covered by this time, and by the 
early 1960s computers were beginning to revolutionize business in the capitalist 
world. This was not lost on Supreme Sovnarkhoz Chairman Dzherman Gvishiani, 
who had long analyzed Western theories of management and social science, and 
who was a major proponent of automation. In his 1962 work The Sociology of 
Business: A Critical Essay on American Management Theory  he cites the 
interpersonal theories of sociologists Rensis Likert, DouglasMac Gregor and 
Robert MacMurray,
127
 which complimented contemporary interest in building 
cybernetic networks for economic management. Gvishiani cites Peter Drucker's 
classic text, "The Practice of Management" repeatedly
128
, along with a study of 
American innovation by one Herbert Apteker titled ―Laureat of Imperialism", 
which held up the effectiveness of the American telephone and telegraph systems, 
and the corporate model of General Electric, as examples of how American 
appreciation for connectivity helped it establish the most functional systems on 
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 Gvishiani was Kosygin's son-in-law, and may very well have brought 
these theories and influences not only to his reports, but to the premier's dinner 
table, reinforcing the assumption that those at the highest levels were aware of the 
capacity of computers and the need to ease the flow of information in the USSR. 
Achieving this in practice was an entirely different story; between the vision of 
computers and the reality stretched a gap nearly as wide as that between East and 
West. 
The correspondence of G.N. Petelin is revealing regarding the use and 
perception of computers in the Soviet Union during this period. Petelin was a labor 
economist and central committee member with many connections abroad, and an 
advocate of disarmament. He was also the head of the Profsoyuz for workers in state 
institutions, a broad-based trade union which included, among other things, a broad 
range of academic and research institutions. The Profsoyuz headed by Petelin listed 
among its activities the organization and funding of conferences for scientific research 
and other skilled trades. In May 1962, the Profsoyuz ordered ten calculating 
machines for the use of the Calculations Bureau. The committee issued a report 
declaring the machines necessary, and entrusted one of its members, P.F. Ladikov 
to negotiate the production of these machines through the appropriate government 
channels. The machines and the personnel required are described only in terms of 
their cost and labor-saving ability, and less in terms of the result they are intended 
to produce. The Profsoyuz justifies the machines primarily in order to stay within 






its state-mandated budget, and describes how the machines will save the work and 
expense of several clerks.
130
 How the machines might alter or improve the work of 
Profsoyuz, or even how they will be incorporated, is not mentioned in the brief 
request. 
 
Changes in the Scientific Community in the USSR 
 
Automation was an oft-declared priority for the Soviet Union in the 1950s 
into the 1960s, but automation was not always synonymous with computer-
controlled production or economic modeling.
131
 The term more typically described 
automation in advanced assembly line production, regulation of devices used in 
heavy industry, and more specific automated calibration methods. Automation of 
this kind took precedence over computer-assisted management in industry into the 
1950s.  
The scope of the term ―automation‖ grew significantly in the West during 
these years, but in the Soviet Union it seems to have been primarily associated 
with its more traditional connotations for far longer. The Soviets were pioneers in 
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the automatic regulation of heavy industry, but automatic regulation of electrical 
systems, including the development of computers, was for much of its history 
subset of industrial automation.
132
 A number of ministries connected to various 
industries within the Soviet Union oversaw computer research and production.  
 
Those in the research community often understood far more about the 
potential scope of automation than their superiors within regional planning 
commissions or the Central Committee. A.I. Kondalev, a member of the Academy 
of Sciences of the Ukranian SSR, described the proceedings of a 1959 conference 
in Kiev with the following; 
―It is now evident that the effective solution of many 
scientific problems, involving huge computations, as well as of 
problems of complex automation, control of economic activity, 
planning, accounting and statistics is impossible without a highly-
developed computer machine technique, mainly in the form of high-





More than 300 scientists, men and women engaged in various aspects of 
computing research, from across the USSR, Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
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attended the scientific-technical conference in question. As the 1960s progressed, 
the changing economic and political landscape of the Soviet Union would have 
profound effects on how scientific work was done, and with whom scientists in a 
given field might communicate. Khrushchev's dubious efforts at reforming the 
Soviet economy in the early 1960s involved the splitting of the Party into 
agricultural and industrial branches, and the creation of regional economic 
subdivisions devoted to each.
134
 On one level, this was supposed to improve the 
agility and responsiveness of Soviet industry and agriculture, improving efficiency 
and allowing the USSR to move into a period of economic diversification. These 
regional divisions and specifications within the party were intended to speed the 
development of light industry, including production of consumer goods and more 
varied foodstuffs.  
 Khrushchev's efforts to grow the economy and raise the standard of living 
also involved the intense application of scientific and technological solutions to 
these problems. Towards these ends, the standard Soviet practices of centralization 
and control were increasingly applied to the scientific community. The founding of 
new scientific centers and entire towns devoted to a single field of research made 
Soviet and international headlines.
135
 What could not be gauged from public and 
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Party enthusiasm, or alarm overseas, regarding these measures was the degree to 
which researchers were becoming entirely dependent upon the Party for their 
livelihoods, from their research space to their apartment homes. In myriad science 
towns, typically many kilometers from the nearest urban center, not only the 
scientists' own advancement, but the food they ate and the schools their children 
attended had become more dependent on their compliance with Party measures that 
determined the direction of their work than ever before.
136
 
Soviet leadership sought ways to explain how its new economic strategy fit 
into Marxist-Leninist constructs on the nature of the state economy. This 
manifested itself most directly in what was almost certainly a deliberate alteration 
of Lenin's words to suit the needs of the moment. In the fall of 1962, a young 
researcher uncovered a ―new document by Lenin‖ which stated that the path to 
socialism would lead through a stage ―where political tasks must be subordinated 
by economic ones.‖
137
 The lack of official fanfare which greeted the researcher's 
finding, as well as the explanation for why such a vital opinion of Lenin's had been 
previously lost to history cast doubt upon the circumstances of its emergence, even 
though no subsequent questioning of the document's authenticity emerged. The 
immediate publication of the document by the Supreme Sovnarkhoz (and virtually 
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no one else) raised eyebrows, as well as the cool response to the document among 
top Party leaders.
138
 In 1963, theoretician G.E. Glezerman, reflecting on the 
longstanding party slogan ―Politics cannot fail to dominate economics,‖ noted that 
Lenin ―was not above contradicting himself on occasion.‖
139
 Regardless of its 
intentions, ideology is eroded by such treatment. In a social and economic system 
built entirely upon an ideology represented by a handful of seminal political 
philosophers, to chip away at the legacy of those figures is to hack at the 
foundation of the system itself. 
It is often the view of government that science should serve the needs of the 
nation; indeed, a contemporary internal paper from the US State Department 
commented that scientists should be ―on tap, but not on top.‖
140 
However, in the 
view of the Soviet Communist Party, science existed primarily to serve the state 
and its economic and social ends. The level of control the Party would come to 
exert over scientific practice and the scientists themselves would soon approach a 
stranglehold, preventing communication and stifling the free thinking and 
interdisciplinary experimentation required for innovations in high technology.  
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B.N. Malinofsky, who stood at the forefront of many early computing 
efforts, recalls in Chapter 6 of Pioneers of Soviet Computing, ―The separation of 
science and manufacturing into different departments was not the most efficient 
method of production, although it had positive aspects- the operational assistance 
to companies was approved much faster and implemented more efficiently.‖
141
 To 
Party leadership, the free flow of ideas among scientists working at the highest 
levels seemed not only an unproductive use of their time, but an extremely 
dangerous proposition. Empowering managers within the state industrial structure 
to interact with and draw from scientific developments in computing was also 
avoided, as it might threaten Party control.
142
  
During the early 1960s, the USSR responded to its changing needs by 
restructuring the state organs responsible for research, and the tight controls 
imposed on all would serve to splinter the concerted efforts of its best minds. The 
Soviet scientific establishment would expand more rapidly between 1960 and 1972 
than it ever had, with ever-more specific institutes established inside and outside of 
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Unlike research institutes in the U.S., these facilities were unlikely 
to be connected to any academic function.  
Scientific and political leadership slowly merged as the prestige of science 
also became a respected political credential; a man at the top of his field might 
carry significant influence over both research and policy. However, this made for 
an increasingly conservative and industry-focused top layer among the strata 
within the scientific community.
144
 There is evidence to suggest that such 
conservative elements within Soviet education were reluctant to embrace 
computers, and that this resulted in a lack of available training and a depressed 
demand for hardware, even within institutions ostensibly dedicated to their 
study.
145
 At every level within the Soviet system, both before and especially after 
Khrushchev's reforms, the development and adoption of computers seemed to 
encounter virtually unmovable obstacles. 
In addition to the scarcity of materials and production capacity for 
computer components, lack of development of peripheral devices (which might 
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require the cooperation of an entirely different branch of Soviet research and 
industry) held back the development of practical computer models for mass 
production and limited the functionality of existing models. By the mid-1960s, the 
USSR began to look outward to both the West and its allies in Eastern Europe, to 
share in the process of development and the production of computer hardware and 
peripherals. This openness to outside innovation and cooperation represented a sea-
change in the Soviet Union's attitudes towards both global economics and its 
relationship with the West. It could also be interpreted as a symptom of Soviet 
opportunism taken to the point of self-destruction.  
 
The Rise of COMECON 
 
 Among the factors affecting international trade in the 1960s was the 
advancing role of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON (also 
known as CMEA). A number of economic and infrastructure-related reforms 
undertaken by COCOM countries in the late 1960s depended heavily on 
computerization. Stalin had envisioned COMECON as a counterbalance to the 
Common Market and the economic collaboration between the U.S. and Western 
Europe resulting from the Marshall Plan. However, until the late 1950s, 
COMECON had little reality beyond the declaration that created it.
146
 The 
favorable trade arrangements between member states facilitated technology 
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transfer between member states, and also formed the basis for cooperation on 
large, multinational projects related to energy and industry within Eastern Europe.  
One of the chief undertakings of COMECON in the 1960s was the 
development of an international power grid, first established in 1962.
147
 Lenin had 
envisioned electrification as an integral part of socialist development, and such 
projects had an almost incomparable social and industrial impact. Computers were 
essential to the efficient and reliable operation of such a grid, and a reliable grid 
required reliable computers, and much research and discussion had already taken 
place regarding the automated control of such systems.
148
 This was, unfortunately, 
something socialist Eastern Europe was unable to supply for itself.
149
  
Production of iron and steel in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR was 
to be coordinated by computers through the COCOM programming agency 
―Intermetal‖. In 1962, a COMECON international power grid was established to 
make up for shortcomings in domestic power production among some members.
150
 
Improvements to this grid, and its administration center in Prague, required 
significant investment in computerized switching systems. Acquisition of such 
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power-switching technology was among the key drivers of East-West technology 
transfer. 
As the post-war period drew to a close, the contrast in living standards between 
Western and Eastern Europe was growing impossible to ignore. The violent Soviet 
repression of political and economic reforms in the late 1950s was an episode that 
could not be repeated if the USSR were to claim a legitimate leadership role in global 
politics.
151 
The development of an international economic alliance between communist 
states would not only give the USSR a diplomatically acceptable organ through which 
assert its dominance over states that were no longer the satellites they once were, but 
would allow communist countries an avenue for participation in an construction of an 
international socialist economy.
152
 A massive push for computer development by 
Central Committee in 1959 coincided with plans for central economic and industrial 
planning on an international scale.
153
 Significant investment and modern management 
methods would be required for COMECON‘s ambitious goals of economic and 
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Changes in Export Controls and Socialist Economies, 1962-66 
 
―The history of the U.S.S.R. provides a unique example of the rise 
and development of a great power. It took its mortal enemy as a model, 
and legally or illegally adopted all the technical, industrial and scientific 
achievements from the whole of Western Europe and America for its 
own use, claiming them as its own...If the Soviets had succeeded, as 
Bolshevism continuously boasts, then this would have been a triumph 
for international capitalism, which supplied the credit, the machinery, 
the designs, the patents, the engineers and the technicians, everything 
indeed of decisive importance, the whole of capitalist production in fact 
for the Russians' use.‖  
 --Werner Keller, East Minus West Equals Zero, quoted by Sen. 
 Karl Mundt before Congress as part of an argument to strengthen 




―However unusual this may sound to some conservatives who do not 
wish to comprehend elementary truths, we will be building communism 
on the basis of the most broad use of electronic machines, capable of 
processing enormous amounts of technological, economic, and 
biological information in the shortest time...These machines, aptly called 
‗cybernetic machines‘, will solve the problem of continuous optimal 
planning and control.‖ 
--Engineer Admiral Aksel‘ Berg, Chairman of the Academy 





 The warming relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union rapidly chilled in 
the wake of the U-2 Incident, and flared terrifyingly hot with the Cuban Missile Crisis 
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in 1962. The intentions of each side in the détente of the late 1950s and early 1960s 
were often unclear to the other. This was partly due to the lack of adequate peacetime 
diplomatic precedent or policy on the part of the US and the inherently insular and 
secretive decision making processes at work in the Soviet Union.
156
 However, even as 
the first détente came grinding to a halt, it was clear that the process would almost 
certainly resume at some point. By 1963 there emerged a series of policies that would 
form the foundation of US-Soviet relations for the next thirty years.  
 The period from 1958-1968 saw a general liberalization of East-West trade. By 
1960, the postwar economy had stabilized, and a largely recovered Western Europe 
was testing the waters of trade with the Eastern Bloc. West Germany was among the 
first to quietly resume a trading relationship with the more accessible socialist states 
on its border, and shortly reaped an impressive profit.
157
 France, Britain, and other 
NATO member nations were soon engaging in a brisk trade of non-strategic items. 
Although this was a small fraction of their overall trade commitments, Eastern Europe 
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 In retrospect, it seems inevitable that Western Europe would resume trade with 
its contiguous neighbors, many of whom had deep historical trading relationships 
regardless of political conflict. However, the United States was quick to remind its 
fellow members in NATO of the risks of doing business with socialists. Throughout 
the early 1960s, as Western Europe increasingly came to chafe at the restrictions 
imposed upon trade by the US State Department and Department of Commerce. It had 
become increasingly difficult to enforce certain restrictions, as European businesses 




 As détente seemed about to crumble in the months before the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk was asked in a televised interview 
why American citizens seemed to proclaim their political opinions more loudly than 
Europeans. Rusk mentions ―aristocratic tradition‖ at work in Europe; this explains 
why more Americans have strong opinions about foreign relations than their European 
counterparts. Europeans are more inclined to leave international matters to be handled 
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by their leaders. 
160
 In a second TV interview, he calls American and European 
defense ―indivisible‖ and ―vital to both‖, and flatly explains that he does not think 
Europe wants to expend the effort to defend itself without help from the United 
States.
161
 This dismissive attitude, coupled with aggressive American efforts to 
establish missile bases in Europe, gave the impression that the US was not especially 
concerned with the fates of its closest allies. 
 Lack of diplomatic skill on the part of American representatives, among other 
factors, contributed to a drift in opinion on economic and foreign policy matters. By 
1961, the United States was actively reviewing what until then had been enthusiastic 
support for increasing European unity; on one hand, a Western Europe that enjoyed 
greater political gravity might draw the nations of Eastern Europe further out of 
Moscow's orbit.
162
 On the other hand, the competition that might be created by an 
economically and politically united Europe would create an uncomfortable degree of 
competition for the US in both arenas. One possible answer to this was for the US to 
try to strengthen its trans-Atlantic alliances, ensuring itself an integral role in Europe's 
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―Planning Paper on European Unity,‖ September 5, 1961. National Archives and Records 
Administration, Washington, DC, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Regional Planning 




future without directly asserting itself.
163
 The fact that the US was considering this 
possibility in 1961 makes it plausible that this reasoning played a role in its later 
compromises to preserve the system of international export controls. If COCOM had 
collapsed and its member states gone their separate ways, it would have dealt a 
tremendous blow to American influence abroad. 
 
 Between 1960 and 1970, trade between Eastern and Western Europe increased 
280 percent. In the same period, US-Eastern European trade increased by only 60 
percent, and amounted to less than US trade with the Philippines.
164
 Throughout the 
1960s, many American businessmen and industrialists pressed for increased trade, 
joined by those who believed in trade as a path to more normalized relations with the 
socialist world.
165
 Part of the reason for the mounting pressure was the economic 
threat of a resurgent Europe, the interests of which had begun to conflict with 
American foreign policy goals. 
 In 1963, a State Department circular warned that current détente and Soviet 
willingness to open up to trade may tempt NATO allies away from political goals, and 
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expressed a desire to avoid a credit race with Western Europe.
166
 In any case, it was 
clear the U.S. would need to respond to its allies' increasingly enthusiastic extensions 
of credit. From 1962-65, France extended a total of $10 million US dollars in credit to 
the USSR. In 1966, that figure jumped to $116 million. Italy went from offering no 
long-term credits to offering $318 million in US dollars in 1966. Belgium, W. 
Germany, France and Italy all extended more credit to Eastern European nations (in 
this case Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) in 
1966 than they had in the preceding 3 years combined. The UK lent less, as did Japan 
and Austria. These credits had a repayment schedule exceeding five years, presuming 
continued détente and an ongoing financial relationship with the Eastern Bloc.
167
 
 Once the Berlin Wall had gone up, stabilizing (if unsatisfactorily) the political 
situation, West Germany almost immediately began exploiting trade loopholes, and 
was soon reaping an enviable profit from its trade with Eastern Europe.
168
 By 1964, 
West Germany had become the largest exporter to the Soviet Union, despite the fact 
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that no formal trade agreement or long-range deferred payment plan existed between 
the two governments.
169
 In 1965, the West German government approved the 
exportation of a petrochemical refinery worth $150 million US dollars. The payback 
terms indicated that the West German business group anticipated working closely with 




 Central Europe was also rapidly becoming a major market for Eastern 
European agricultural goods:  
―No one who has seen the large Bulgarian semitrailers and 
trailers, built incidentally in West Germany, on their regular journeys 
from, say, Plovdiv or Pazardzhik to Central Europe, with cargoes of 
lettuce, artichokes, or dessert grapes, can doubt that foreign markets 





The traffic in seasonal produce demonstrates that trade with Eastern Europe 
was becoming an integral part of the improving standard of living in Western 
Europe, and these Western markets a lucrative outlet for whatever the East could 
produce. However, it was difficult to pay for licenses and production lines with 
                                                          
 
169
―Role of Deferred Payment Conditions in Japan-Soviet Machinery and Plant Trade in the Light of 
Current Western European Machinery and Plant Exports to the Soviet Union, 1965,‖ National 
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, RG 263, Records of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Job #78-0496A, NN3-263-99-003, p.ii.  
 
170
 Ibid. p.iv 
 
171
 Norman Pounds, ―Fissures in the Eastern European Bloc,‖ Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science; Realignments in the Communist and Western Worlds. Vol. 372 (July 
1967), pp.40-58, p.48. 
74 
 
either fruit or COMECON's precious hard currency, and so the availability of 
credit would play a pivotal role East-West technology transfer.  
  
 While more conservative voices tended to prevail within the Amercian 
government, there were many who favored increased trade with communist Eastern 
Europe. For some, including the Policy Planning Commission within the State 
Department, trading relationships could prove strategic in promoting détente without 
sacrificing American interests. Trade would reduce Eastern European dependence on 
the USSR, and draw the former satellites further out of Soviet orbit. Whereas direct 
political or military interference would likely only destabilize the region, trade could 
yield mutual benefits as well.
172
 
 Makers of foreign policy also had to contend with pressure from the business 
and scientific communities, who saw the restrictions on commerce as missed 
opportunities.
173
 Trade in commodities such as grain rose steadily throughout the 
early 1960s. Socialist states seeking to acquire raw materials and non-strategic items 
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from the West would often supplement their limited hard currency with specialty 




 In a series of State Department documents used in development of the 1963 
policy paper ―Steps in a Process Toward Détente,‖ various parties from within the 
Policy Planning Council weigh in on the possible steps that could support American 
interests in future détentes with the USSR.
175
 The particular mindset at work within 
the US State Department is evident from such documents. By 1963, détente is already 
being described as a ―ploy‖, and the authors attempt to determine a historical pattern 
previous détente-seeking on the part of the Soviets.
176
 Previous ―détentes‖ are cited, 
including Stalin's cooperation during World War II, and the brief outreach of Soviet 
leaders as they sought stability after Stalin's death. The fact that these were considered 
periods of détente is revealing, and provide evidence as to why subsequent attempts to 
improve relations between the US and Soviet Union failed. 
 The ―peaceful coexistence‖ sought by Eisenhower and Khrushchev in the late 
1950s was fundamentally different from previous periods of cooperation or laxity in 
that the Soviets were acknowledged to have obtained a position of strength. Public 
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opinion at the time placed the technological advantage, especially in the field of 
missile technology and rocketry firmly in the USSR's court.
177
 The launch of Sputnik 
had placed the US on notice and shaken the West to its core. Khrushchev seized this 
advantage to advance a muscular foreign policy, pushing the socialist agenda forward 
on a global scale.  
 However, from the point of view of the State Department, the Soviets offered 
détente only when they wanted something, particularly to ―cut a loss‖ as they did in 
Korea, or ―get rid of a particularly dangerous irritant‖ in the case of the Berlin 
blockade. Most damning is the charge that the USSR ―used détente to cover a planned 
specific act of aggression‖ during the weeks preceding Cuban Missile Crisis.
178
 In any 
case, moves toward improved relations were to be viewed with suspicion and handled 
with a minimum of enthusiasm.  
 This interpretation of Soviet actions by the by the State Department would 
color future interactions, and no approach by the USSR for improved relations could 
be trusted. This was a perfectly valid interpretation, as previous progress had been 
quickly reversed, and the possibility of détente used unsuccessfully as leverage by 
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 By American estimation, the Soviets viewed détente as a 
―continuation of war by other means,‖ easily abandoned when their immediate needs 
had been served.
180
 In this, they were at least half right; ―peaceful coexistence‖ was 
not intended to be true peace, but the transfer of the struggle against capitalism from a 
military playing field to an ideological one. In the era of ―Sputnik Diplomacy‖, the 
Soviet Union had worked hard to increase its influence abroad and win allies in the 
anti-colonial revolutionary movements taking place across the developing world. It 
had alarmed the West with its technological capacity, and with so much Soviet 
research shrouded in secrecy, its potential destructive power in terms of missile 
capacity could not be conclusively determined.
181
 However, the idea that violent 
struggle need not be inevitable was an increasingly important message in the nuclear 
age, and with Khrushchev that possibility had finally been voiced by a Soviet leader. 
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Khrushchev's Late Reforms and their Effects on the Sciences 
 
 Khrushchev's reforms in the late 1950s had streamlined some of the byzantine 
bureaucracy that had evolved under Stalin; 1957 had been a triumphal year for 
Khrushchev, and he had been empowered to push through a series of changes that 
alienated much of the old guard.
182
 Subsequently, his significant reductions in the size 
of the military during 1960 and 1961 further removed top Red Army brass from 
influence, and the Party began to reassert control over the armed forces as it had not 
for many years.
183
 However, the reforms undertaken by Khrushchev as the 1960s 
began would be compromised by the a series of national embarrassments, political 
miscalculations, and the General Secretary's decreasing personal power, resulting in 
the proliferation of bureaucratic functions and loss of effectiveness. 
 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the decidedly military bent of the Soviet 
economy, with its intense focus on steel, was being reconsidered. Khrushchev railed 
against proponents of heavy industry, the ―steel-eaters‖, who he charged with holding 
back needed reforms.
184
 The ―steel-eaters‖ typically represented not only the old 
Stalinist economy, but the Stalinist ideologies that were slowly being driven from the 
ranks. In the field of computing research, a great number of endeavors were tied to 
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military research institutes. The defense ministerial system oversaw much of the total 




 The impressive economic gains made during the 1950s and first years of the 
1960s were sharply curtailed by 1962. Accurate and easily translatable economic 
figures were not always easy to come by in these years, but in 1965 a series of 
revealing gaffes on the part of economists and the state-run press showed how badly 
the Soviet economy had been affected by agricultural failures and industrial decline.
186
 
For most of the 1950s, the Soviet economy grew at a rate of at least 6% per year; by 
1962, that rate had slowed to 2.5%; the CIA speculated that the USSR was already 
exhausting itself by ―attempting to match U.S. outlays for national defense, space, and 
industrial investment.‖
187
 ―Further, the Soviets had eroded their gold holdings through 
over-ambitious purchases from the West of industrial plants and equipment.‖
188
 By 
1965, even inflated Soviet official statistics could no longer be manipulated to disguise 
this decline. 
                                                          
 
185




―Memorandum, RE: CIA-Soviet Controversy on Recent Rates of Economic Growth,‖ Aug. 3, 1965. 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, RG 263, Records of the CIA, 
Soviet Finished Intelligence, Acc.#NN3-263-06-003, p.1 
 
187
 Ibid. p.2  
 
188
 Ibid. p.3 
80 
 
  Domestically, there had been a series of poor harvests, which in one notorious 
case led to troops firing on a crowd protesting high meat prices in Novocherkassk in 
1962.
 
Beyond Soviet borders, Khrushchev's poor showing in handling the issue of 
Berlin, the deep rift that had developed between the USSR and China, and the fiasco 
surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis had all eroded Khrushchev's support within the 
Presidium and the Central Committee.
189
 The Cuban crisis had also exposed the 
Soviet Union's technological vulnerability; the embarrassment of this would not be 
lost on policymakers in the years to come, and would become and important driver for 
new forms of state involvement in the sciences.
190
 The poor economy, and efforts to 
cut spending, had led to general cutbacks in domestic spending; in the sciences, this 
was seen most notably in support of scientific publishing and conference 
attendance.
191
 While overall science budgets would remain large, individual 
institutions would be expected to carry a greater portion of the financial burden of 
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research out of their own budgets, paying for their expanding rolls and research 
obligations by contracting with factories or collective farms.
192
  
 By early 1963, it was clear that Khrushchev's plans to reform the economy 
would not take shape without significant concessions to his adversaries. Khrushchev's 
plan to divide the Party into agricultural and industrial branches, and the Soviet 
economy, into administrative regions would be coupled with the creation of other 
administrative organs favorable to opposing elements within the Central 
Committee.
193
 These included the creation of a ―Supreme National Economic 
Council‖, or ―Supreme Sovnarkhoz‖ at the head of each branch of industry, 
responsible to the USSR Council of Ministers. Khrushchev had objected to the idea 
during the 1957 reforms, but by March of 1963 he lacked the political strength to fight 
its passage by the Supreme Soviet. In this one move, management of the Soviet 
economy was balkanized both horizontally and vertically, creating a series of 
bureaucracies that were rife with redundancy and lacked any clear accountability, 
authority or clear chain of command.
194
 Nearly 100 federal ministers would now 
report to Supreme Sovnarkhoz leadership on the activities of the various branches of 
the economy as well as the work of ―planning committees‖ and ―coordination 
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councils‖ composed of dozens of people, some with overlapping responsibilities 
within different economic and industrial organs and the Party itself.  
 One group who clearly gained an advantage by the creation of the Supreme 
Sovnarkhoz system was military leadership. Khrushchev had dealt the military a 
devastating blow with his reforms, reducing the size of the Red Army considerably. 
As Khrushchev's power waned, however, the military became a resurgent force in 
Soviet politics.
195
 This was significant in that the military aligned themselves with 
Khrushchev's economic adversaries, the ―steel-eaters‖ who favored a Stalinist 
approach focused on heavy industry and steel production. Khrushchev and his allied 
reformers wished to place more emphasis on chemicals and consumer durables, which 
to date had been weak points.
196
 When the Supreme Sovnarkhoz was created on 
March 13, 1962 Marshal D.F. Ustinov, who had suffered a demotion under 
Khrushchev, was promoted to First Deputy Prime Minister and placed at the helm. 
Five of the eight other deputies would report directly to him, including the heads of 
Gosplan, Gosstroi, Sovnarkhoz, KNIR (Committee for Scientific Research) and 
Defense. The last word on numerous sectors of the economy, including ―defense 
technology, aeronautics, electronics, radio-electronics, naval construction, atomic 
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energy and medium-scale mechanical engineering,‖ among others, now fell to one 




 Further reforms were required, and had been planned by Khrushchev and like-
minded leadership, for whom the development and application of new technologies 
would be paramount, but before they could be implemented the leader himself found 
his influence slipping.
198
 With the diplomatic failure of Berlin, the economic and 
resulting social disruptions of the poor harvest, and the disastrous international 
revelations regarding Soviet military power in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
first years of the 1960s had already seen a number of economic and political failures 
for Khrushchev and his approach to government.
199
 The mastery of applied research 
to revolutionize the economy was still a primary goal, but how to successfully 
implement programs to do so in a centrally-planned economy was unclear. Meeting 
the challenge of the West was perhaps the most widely agreed-upon priority; during 
the early 1960s, the USSR attempted a ―brute approach‖, dedicating vast budgets and 
small armies to the aim of surpassing the West.
200
  Still, these vast budgets devoted to 
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―science‖ did not necessarily add up to greater resources at the disposal of researchers, 
and could be largely accounted for by personnel.
201
  
 The establishment of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for 
the Coordination of Scientific Research in 1961 served to extend bureaucratic 
control over R&D within the Soviet Union. This organ was a modern counterpart 
to the earlier NTO (Nauchno-tekhnicheskii otdel Vysshego Soveta Narodnogo 
Khoziaistvo), the scientific-technical wing of the Supreme Economic Council 
established in the 1920s.202 According to Soviet historian Alexander Vucinich, 
―the State Committee was a single organization entrusted with planning and 
directing both applied and basic research on a national scale.‖
203
 This entity 
determined ―the main lines of capital investment in science [and]...plan the 
establishment of intersectoral research centers.‖ Under the State Committee, 
nothing less than an attempt to plan both scientific and technological progress in 
tandem became state policy.
204
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 There was a decided bias within the Academy of Sciences, and also within the 
research community, towards theoretical rather than applied work.
205
 This was partly 
due to prestige and also to the fact that applied research was not materially provided 
for by institutional budgets.
206
  Akademician V. Trapeznikov, a former First Deputy 
Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology commented in 
Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta in 1968 that ―We spend on scientific research approximately 
as much as on the preparation of technical documentation, the creation of experimental 
samples and technological processes, instead of spending on the latter three times as 
much as on research. Therefore, the experimental base has become the bottleneck of 
science, delaying the assimilation and implementation of scientific findings.‖
207
 A 
contemporary article in Voprosy Filosofii asserted that Soviet scientists had ―only 
about 40 percent of the space and equipment available to their American 
counterparts.‖
208
 This was the case even after Soviet central planning asserted itself 
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 Much like the notorious ―monogorods‖ based on production of a single 
commodity, these ―scientific towns‖ focused the bulk of high-level research in specific 
fields within a single space, a town entirely driven by and devoted to the work of an 
institute. These research towns were often set on the outskirts of a city, planned and 
constructed with a research institute and testing facilities as their focal point.
210
 On 
one hand, they brought together and supported the best minds in a given field. On the 
other, they isolated their scientists from the wider research community, and made 
them even more dependent on political favor than they had been in the past. Thus the 
Central Committee, along with the various organs through which it administered to 
national scientific priorities, came to exercise more closely vested control over 
scientific inquiry.  
 
Brezhnev's Reactions and Reforms 
 
 In 1964, a number of reforms to the Soviet economic and industrial planning 
organ, GOSPLAN, were introduced. With the Eighth Five-Year Plan to begin in 1968, 
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the new GOSPLAN promised to unravel a Gordian knot of bureaucratic calculations 
and estimate with a fleet of computers generating statistics and production plans 
automatically.
211
 The sovnarkhozy were abolished in 1965, but the positions they 
encompassed predated them and persisted afterwards, and the additional powers the 
sovnarkhozy had bestowed upon them were not revoked, leaving the individuals filling 
those positions with greater freedom to control the economic life of their regions. 
These local bureaucrats would fight for the status quo, and often stood in the way of 
technological advancement if they felt it endangered stability.
212
 
Until 1965 all scientific computing research was overseen by the State 
Committee on Radio Electronics. A restructuring effort then placed it under the 
auspices of both the Ministry of the Radio Industry and the Ministry of Machine 
Construction. The former was to handle ―universal and specialized‖ computers, and 
the latter ―automation and control‖ systems. In addition to the confusion this 
restructuring created, quotas and timetables were imposed on both sides, meaning that 
research and construction frequently took place concurrently, often involving entirely 
new and untried components and technologies.
213
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The agencies named above were not, strictly speaking, the only ones involved 
in the production of computer components or in research. The Ministry of the 
Communications Equipment Industry, the Ministry of the Electro-technical Industry, 
the Ministry of Electronics Industry and the Ministry of the Appliance Industry were 
all at some point responsible for projects related to computer research or production.
214
  
Lack of communication or channels for sharing of ideas between these agencies 
further slowed their collective progress. The Central Committee demanded that these 




Communication between scientists and technologists hindered the effective 
deployment of innovations within the Soviet economy, an administrat ive 
shortcoming lamented by many reformers, including men close to Khrushchev 
such as economist Dzherman Gvishiani, and Premier Alexei Kosygin. In 
Gvishiani's view, ―Planned and purposeful development of a country's scientific 
and technological potential is governed by objective laws; it calls for the 
establishment of correct proportions between its structural elements and regulation 
of factors leading to disproportions.‖
216
 This reveals that central to the ideology 
surrounding Soviet science was the idea that scientific progress could be dictated 
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from above and administered in a controlled fashion like any other economic 
matter. Innovation, however, did not flourish amid the constant bureaucratic 
restructuring and scientific attempts to quantify and render governable all the 
needs and wants that it should serve. This idea was further reflected in the birth of 
a new field of social science known as ―science management‖, or 
―prognostication,‖ which essentially amounted to the study of studies, only its 




In 1966, Leonid Brezhnev cited computers as an especially important area that 
was not meeting expectations before the 23
rd
 Communist Party Congress:  
―Mention should be made of the deficiencies that hold up 
[Soviet science's] development. The gravest of these is the slow 
introduction of completed scientific research into production. There is 
an unjustifiable gap between theoretical research and its technological 
and design development. Often, years pass before a discovery is 
applied in production – a fact damaging to the national economy and 






 Unfortunately, regardless of what powerful personages voiced the importance 
of computing, without direct and carefully administered support, no progress could be 
made. Bureaucrats and factory directors alike were under intense pressure to make 
regular quotas, and were thus disincentivized from experimentation; applied 
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computing research found minimal funding from institutes or from parties who might 
have funded it through contract work.
219
 According to Slava Gerovitch: 
 ―The potential computerization of economic decision-making 
threatened the established power hierarchy and faced stubborn 
opposition at all levels of Soviet bureaucracy. Through an endless 
process of reviews, revisions, and reorganizations, Soviet government 
agencies were able to slow down the cybernetic reform and eventually 
brought it to a halt. As the idea of an overall economic reform 
withered away, so did the plans for a nationwide computer network, 




An ambitious plan within the Cybernetics Institute to build ―a single automated 
system of control of the national economy‖
221
 found few backers willing to dedicate 
the necessary resources to such a task. ―With the lack of political and financial 
support, the Institute soon dropped the automated economic management information 
system from its research agenda and focused on the development of optimal 
mathematical models. Practical reform was supplanted by optimization on paper.‖
222
 
The USSR, despite all of its investments in personnel, found it extraordinarily difficult 
to progress past square one in terms of experimentation or hardware, making 
production and successful implementation of computers an increasingly distant dream. 
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East-West Trade: Support and Resistance 
 
"Every merchant selling a Communist import, every American 
citizen buying a Communist import, helps by just that much to keep 
the Communist munitions program geared up and fully operating. 
This is inevitable when we pursue the profane policy which 
promotes trade with an enemy while we seek at the same time to 
defeat it...This is why the Soviet Union does not have engineers to 
design automobiles, petrochemical plants and all the rest of the 
civilian products embodied by our modern economy- they are off 
building weapons of war."  
– United States Senator Karl Mundt (R-Montana), 




 As the main point of conflict with the USSR shifted from Berlin to Vietnam 
after the death of Kennedy, many voices within the government objected to trade with 
communist states, especially the USSR. However, it was clear that the Johnson 
Administration saw more good than harm in opening more avenues to trade with 
Eastern Europe; even as the situation in Vietnam worsened, Johnson demonstrated a 
commitment to ‗incremental détente‘ by improving access to credit through the 
Import-Export Bank for Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
224
 This offer 
was strategic on multiple levels. In 1964, Dean Rusk felt that the ability to be flexible 
on trade controls increased the diplomatic options available to the US. By ―treating 
different Communist States differently‖ as the situation demanded, the US could 
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create leverage in negotiations while possibly drawing the former Soviet satellites 
further out of the USSR's orbit.
225
 
 Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, who took office in 1964, hoped that 
establishing trade ties with the West would encourage peace and strengthen both 
sides. He himself was a strong proponent of technological exchange, not only 
because of the opportunities for civil discourse between nations, but because it 
would ―permit saving hundreds of millions of rubles on scientific-research 
work.‖
226
 Kosygin faced opposition from others within the Party hierarchy, 
including Brezhnev and Suslov.
227
 
 This attitude indicated a profound shift in global affairs, and a departure from 
the hardline tactics of the 1950s. It became possible to embrace the philosophy that the 
Iron Curtain no longer veiled all communist nations equally, and the US had little to 
gain by denying trade privileges to countries willing to challenge Soviet control. 
Khrushchev's ouster in the spring of 1964, and the subsequent plans for rapid 
realignment of the Soviet economy gave encouragement to many who hoped further 
economic autonomy would be granted to Eastern Europe.  
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 After Khrushchev's ouster, Brezhnev was skeptical of the kinds of reforms that 
had taken place under his predecessor, and the USSR witnessed a brief return to 
conservatism and a slackening of trade with the West.
228
 Imports to the USSR from 
the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan declined from 1963-1967. However, by 
1966 Kosygin and Brezhnev were both convinced that reform was needed, and that 
those reforms should encourage trade with the West.
229
 
 Several Eastern European states had historically been given preferential 
treatment by the West, even though their governments were still communist, and they 
would likely share any technological advancements with the USSR. Following the 
political upheavals of 1948, treatment of Yugoslavia by both the US Department and 
COCOM was significantly relaxed, and Yugoslavia had long history of exemption 
from trade control rules. After 1956, Poland was perceived to have slipped from the 
Soviet Union's grip, and thus was granted increasingly liberal trade privileges with the 
West.
230
 In Czechoslovakia during the mid-1960s, economist Ota Šik successfully 
advocated for a system which allowed industry to respond to demand as well as dictate 
supplies in advance, and that allowed prices to better reflect the market. Šik's 
influence brought a measure of autonomy to Czechoslovakian business ventures, 
limited central planning, and allowed for market determination of prices.231 These 
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reforms made Czechoslovakia a relatively attractive trading partner among socialist 
countries, and its defiance of Soviet economic control was a promising political sign. 
  
 During the 1960s, one of the most widely-embraced methods of engaging the 
socialist world was through scientific exchanges of researchers and technicians, and 
through international conferences.
232
 The United States actively participated in a 
number of European scientific and trade fairs throughout this period, both for 
intellectual exchange and for purposes of intelligence-gathering. Trade fairs, 
especially those held regularly in Eastern Europe such as Leipzig in East Germany and 
Brno in Czechoslovakia, were of special importance to Soviet science, and the USSR 
took great care to send their most qualified experts to observe what the rest of the 
world had to offer.
233
  These trade fairs often provided the most accessible exposure 
to foreign technology and to the work of colleagues abroad.  
 Trade shows also provided the most logical way for a Western company to 
enter the consciousness, and the markets, of Eastern Europe. Doing business within 
the USSR required working with the various Foreign Trade Organizations (FTO) 
under the Ministry of Foreign Trade, a byzantine and alien experience for most 
Western businessmen. The Ministry, through the FTOs, handled virtually all 
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international transactions, and controlled the flow of limited Soviet hard currency. 
Locating a buyer, or seller, within the FTOs could be a tricky process, as the 
organizations were intended to act as a filter between Soviet manufacturers and 
foreign businessmen. While they could aid a Western business in navigating through 
the layers of Soviet bureaucracy, their control of the process gave them the power to 
stop commerce in its tracks, with little recourse available to foreign sellers.
234
 
 Among the chief challenges to conducting business with communist partners 
were lack of appropriate forums and provisions for settling disputes and claims. In 
1960, the U.S. concluded a claims settlement agreement with Romania, and as 
Romania further asserted its economic independence from the USSR throughout the 
1960s, its relations with the U.S. improved, leading to an overall relaxation off 
international restrictions on trade.
235
 While Romania pursued a heavily Stalinist vision 
of industrial development, it continually asserted its sovereignty in the face of Soviet 
control. 
  The U.S. also granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to Poland in 1960 
after President Kennedy declared that ―it was no longer dominated or controlled by the 
Soviet Union.‖
236
 However, during the subsequent collapse of détente, the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 imposed the same high tariff rates of 1930 on all countries 
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dominated or controlled by the USSR. President Johnson fought the Trade Expansion 
Act, and determined that it was in the mutual interests of the U.S. and of Poland and 
Yugoslavia for those countries to be eligible for MFN status.
237  
Johnson, as a major 
advocate of ―bridge building‖ measures with the Eastern Bloc, was a strong 
advocate of trade liberalization both for the economic opportunities it prevented 
and the diplomatic options it engendered.
238
 In February of 1965, Johnson created 
a special committee for United States Trade Relations with Eastern European 
Countries and the Soviet Union (The Miller Committee); the committee 
determined that it would be strongly in the national interest to increase East -West 
trade.
239  
 Although political and trade relations with the Eastern Bloc may have shown 
warming trends throughout the early 1960s, they did not always reflected the opinions 
of many Americans on trading with communist states. The U.S. Congress was not 
alone in opposing in increase in trade with socialist countries. ―In addition, private 
groups organized boycotts of Communist goods and of businesses engaged in East-
West trade; maritime unions sporadically refused to load or unload goods destined for 
or coming from Eastern Europe; and a number of municipalities enacted ordinances 
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 Domestic resistance was no small part of the problem, in the eyes of National 
Security Council member David Klein. In 1963 he wrote regarding the strategic use of 
East-West trade: 
―...[T]he exercise is somewhat more complicated, for as pariahs in our 
market place, the Soviets have several additional problems to contend 
with:  
 
(1) The Soviets and their satellites are not entitled to MFN privileges 
(and are unlikely to get them) and therefore must face unequal 
competition.  
(2) In the sale of their goods here, the Soviets and their satellites have 
to contend with importer and consumer resistance, and, in some cases, 
boycott.  
(3) Moreover, the Soviets and their satellites do not have easy access to 
credits. The Battle and Johnson Acts cut off the most important 
sources, although by recent rulings on the Johnson Act, the Justice 
Department has in fact made it possible for the Communist states to 




 Resistance to trade with the socialist world was carried out on a grassroots 
level in some communities. In 1962, the mayor of Fort Wayne, Indiana praised a local 
shopkeeper, along with conservative youth group Young Americans for Freedom 
(YAF) and the local Council of Veterans, for holding a public burning of wicker 
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baskets imported from Yugoslavia.
242
 In 1965, the Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Company was forced to scuttle negotiations with Romania for construction of a 50 
million dollar rubber factory after several groups, including the YAF, waged a public 
campaign against it. The final straw came when the YAF threatened to bombard the 
Indianapolis 500 with propaganda condemning Firestone, and fly ―airplanes trailing 
streamers‖ with anti-Firestone messages above the track throughout the race.
243
 The 
YAF would lead the charge against IBM for its sale, under approved licenses by the 
Department of Commerce, of computers to Eastern Europe in 1967. American unions 
also frequently posed their own obstacles to trade, as the International Longshoreman's 
Association (ILA) did from the 1950s on. The ILA was remarkably effective in nearly 
upending a $140 million sale of wheat to the USSR in 1964, and its members routinely 




 In other words, the costs (and thus the disincentives) for the Soviets would be 
steep, markets for reciprocal trade would be hostile, and credit would be hard to come 
by. All of these factors would limit the effectiveness of trade as a diplomatic and 
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strategic tool. And yet the demand from the USSR for American and Western 
European-made goods only seemed to increase as the 1960s wore on.
245 
 
 With the ever-greater demand for Western goods on the part of socialist 
Eastern Europe came internal pressure within the US to liberalize trade. In 1965, a 
group calling itself the Committee for Economic Progress, composed of 200 leaders in 
business and education, issued a manifesto titled East-West Trade; A Common Policy 
for the West.
246
 This indicated that grassroots support for East-West trade was taking 
root on some level in the United States, at least among some of the nation's elites. On 
July 31, 1964, David Rockefeller visited the Kremlin office of Nikita Khrushchev, and 
spent two hours in intense personal discussion with the Soviet leader. Khrushchev had 
already met with the heads of Westinghouse and Dupont earlier that year.
247
 Among 
Khrushchev's comments Rockefeller reported, was that the General Secretary thought 
―it would be very useful if our two countries were to establish broader ties, especially 
in the field of trade.‖
248 
Where diplomats and elected officials dared not tread, the 
captains of industry were blazing unprecedented ground in the USSR. 
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The Challenge of NATO 
 
―...Finally, we must develop with our allies new means of bridging 
the gap between the East and the West, facing danger boldly wherever 
danger exists, but being equally bold in our search for new agreements 
which can enlarge the hopes of all, while violating the interests of 
none.‖ 
  --Lyndon Johnson, First State of the Union Address, 




―Politicians are the same all over; they promise to build a bridge 
even where there is no river.‖  





 In 1964, reacting to what the U.S. perceived as an increasingly comfortable 
attitude with socialist Eastern Europe on the part of Western Europe, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk warned the NATO allies that no true détente had been reached with 
USSR, and that every precaution must be taken to contain the spread of communism. 
In response, retiring NATO chairman Dirk Stikker had warned that NATO had 
reached a "challenging" phase; French opposition to the organization's military 
structure was placing pressure on the alliance, and within five years NATO's members 
would be able to withdraw freely. It is unlikely that Rusk's simultaneous appeals to 
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Western Europe for military and financial assistance for Vietnam while insisting that 
no concessions be made regarding East-West trade helped the situation.
251
 
In 1965, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Departments of State 
and Commerce set forth new regulations for export control.
252
 Part of the 
motivation for this was a push against nuclear proliferation after Chinese 
acquisition of the atomic bomb in 1964. Along with a renewed effort towards a 
non-proliferation treaty, export controls for items that could be used in the 
development, testing and guidance of nuclear arms came under more robust 
scrutiny.
253
 Among these were the granting of additional powers of review to the 
U.S. Departments of State and Commerce, and demands that a wider range of cases 
be called in for review. The staff director of the Joint Committee at the State 
Department, John Conway, "hoped that the review mechanism in Commerce and 
State would not become merely a rubber-stamping operation and that technical 
advice would be sought as might be needed." Indeed, many of cases would be 
referred to other agencies and commissions for approval. During 1965, the Atomic 
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Energy Commission saw the number of COCOM licensing cases referred to it 
jump from about 400 per year to nearly 2200.
254
  
Among the tighter measures proposed was one to extend the Export Control 
Act of 1949 indefinitely, a move that Assistant Secretary of State Douglas 
MacArthur II wrote would ―imply that the Cold War situation is so much worse 
than it has been in the past that longer-term export control authority is now 
necessary. Such an implication would seem particularly inappropriate at this stage 
of overall relations with the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe.‖
255
 That 
such a move was proposed indicates an element of public opposition to the 
increasing trade with the USSR and the gravity with which non-proliferation was 
pursued. Ultimately, an open-ended provision for strict export controls was voted 
down in favor of a four-year extension. However, pressure to revise export control 
procedures was already building within COCOM.  
  
 By 1966, American allies began to rebel against what they saw as excessively 
restrictive and preferential policies carried out through COCOM for the benefit of the 
United States. A confidential memo drafted by Policy Planning Committee member 
Robert B. Wright dated May 2, 1966 theorizes possible withdrawal of France from 
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COCOM over export restrictions.
256
 By mid-1967 both France and the UK had 
advanced cases before COCOM for the sale of computer CPUs and tape handlers to 
Czechoslovakia. A similar request was pending from Belgium for tape handlers to be 
sold to Poland. The Japanese were also making deals with the Bulgarians for the 
manufacture Japanese-designed oscilloscopes which, like computers, were heavily 
restricted due to their potential use in radar installations. This time, COCOM members 
presented the US with a challenge; review the export list and licensing procedures, or 
take the risk that they would opt out of the export control structure entirely.
257
 
 State Department correspondence from that period indicates the internal 
struggle being waged within COCOM over restrictions barring the sale of licenses and 
production lines: 
 ―The UK has informed us of their disappointment and concern 
about the U.S. Objection to their central processor case; they are not 
pressing their tape handler case ―for the time being‖. The French 
Delegate has indicated the strong possibility his government would 
ignore any objection and proceed with the export. Belgium has not 





 The push for these licenses, the memorandum reveals, did not come solely 
from government sources, but from international firms. The manufacturers involved 
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included General Electric, its European subsidiary Bull Electronics, and International 
Telephone and Telegraph (the ITT Corporation, which early on had expanded into 
computer processors and peripherals).
259
 The difference between this sale and those of 
the past was that these licenses were not only for the machines, but for the means of 
production. The US and its allies had sent more advanced computers to Eastern 
Europe in the past, but the technology for producing them had never been part of the 
transaction.
260
 Thus this license request drew significantly greater scrutiny than many 
that had gone before, and made the flaws of the COCOM system more apparent than 
ever. 
 Among the complaints from the British was the perception that the U.S. had 
manipulated COCOM rules to its own benefit. In 1966, the United Stated had moved 
to remove advanced computers from the Administrative Exceptions Note qualification 
of the embargo rules, limiting its own and its allies' ability to sell advanced technology 
at their own discretion. The British charge was that this allowed U.S. industrial giant 
IBM to flood the Eastern European market with obsolete, low-performing models 
while restricting U.S. allies from the same markets.
261
 The French argued that the 
computers produced with the technology they wished to license had passed COCOM 
                                                          
 
259
 Ibid., p.3 
 
260
―Action Memorandum RE: Export of Computer Technology to Czechoslovakia,‖ from Abraham 
Katz, OECD, to Walter J. Stoessel, Foreign Service Officer, July 20, 1967. National Archives and 




 ―Action Memorandum RE: Computer Manufacturing Licenses in Eastern Europe,‖ p.3 
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review and were freely exported under the Administrative Exceptions Note, thus the 
technology used to produce them should be included as well.
262
 
 At the same time, there began to be real concern that rejection of the French 
license request would cause France to pull out of the COCOM arrangement 
entirely, and that the U.S. would need to be more flexible if the export control 
system was to be maintained. Even if COCOM did not collapse, the French were 
also likely to make a sale without COCOM approval, and a delay or denial on the 
part of the United States would only further antagonize the British, who would not 
only have their own request denied, but potentially a lucrative sale to the Czechs if 
France moved to sell first.
263
 In order to press the U.S. for action, the French and 




 Anthony Solomon replied with a series of recommendations that included a 
number of conditions for the sale. The UK-designed computer license would not 
include semi-conductor technology, the manufacturing technology would not be 
exported, and the computers produced would only be sold in Eastern Europe and 
the USSR. Also, the COCOM International List would not be revised; future 
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licenses would not be subject to an Administrative Exception Note and would still 
need to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
265
 
 Abraham Katz, Director of the OECD in Paris, wrote in regard to the matter 
that ―the computers in question do not represent any technology not already 
available to Eastern Europe,‖ and ―would not significantly enhance the ability of 
Eastern Europeans to produce more sophisticated ―third generation‖ computers.‖
266
 
He supported Solomon's suggestions, and noted that ―COCOM is more likely to 
continue as a useful organization if we grant a no-objection than if we object.‖
267
 
 Abraham Katz of the State Department's Office of European Regional Political 
and Economic Affairs describes the nature of international export controls; "COCOM 
is a brittle organization, held together by the slimmest bonds. If participating countries 
come to feel their interests are too seriously compromised, COCOM will disintegrate. 
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 In May 1966, the Johnson Administration submitted the East-West Trade 
Relations Act to Congress. The act would have ranting the President authority to 
negotiate trade agreements and permitting the socialist Eastern Bloc nations to obtain 
MFN status. However, with the situation in Vietnam rapidly escalating, voices less 
amenable to the idea of trading with communists won out, and the act died in 
Congress in 1967. Legislation to curb the expansion of trade with Eastern Europe 
found more support, such as legislation cutting off credit through the Import-Export 
Bank to communist states until the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.
269
  
 In October of the same year, the COCOM Commodity Control list was 
revised to permit nearly 400 items to be shipped to Eastern Europe under ―general 
license‖ as opposed to the more restrictive ―validated license‖.
270
 This relaxation 
was deemed by many within the U.S. government to have been a sufficient 
concession. However, as has been demonstrated, this slight revision would in no 
way satisfy American allies; the United States Departments of State and Commerce 
were forced to relent, rather than risk the collapse of the entire COCOM 
operation.
271
 The sale of the British and French computers to the Czechoslovakians 
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did in fact go through, and more thorough reform of the export control lists would 
take place in short order. In January of 1967, Soviet policymakers in the area of 
technological research and development had proposed copying the "logical 
structure and command system" of the IBM 360 series. 
272
 By the end of the year, 
the USSR would make reliance on foreign computing technology an official part of 
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The Late 1960s and the Make-or-Take Decision of 1967 
 
 
Economic Pressure for Automation in the USSR 
 
 ―The real meaning of computing was well recognized in the 
USSR, and appropriate efforts were produced in the fields of research 
and development. However, the specific social features were not 
always properly considered.‖ 
 -- Akademician Igor Apokin, Institute of Natural Sciences and  




 ―Eventually, in the 1970s, [the USSR] gave up the attempt to 
develop an independent series of manufactured computers and 
shifted over to IBM architecture and standards. After that it fell 
further and further behind.‖  
--Loren Graham, What Have We Learned About Science and 




 The economic and political crises of the early and mid-1960s, and the shifting 
intellectual paradigms within the socialist world had resulted in a pronounced 
technological lag in Eastern Europe. By the mid-1960s, the Soviets recognized that 
they had been technologically overtaken. Even before Khrushchev's unsuccessful 
efforts at reform, the Soviet economy was groaning under the weight of its own 
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unwieldiness, and constant disruption and diversion of resources during subsequent 
years had only served to erode scientific community and the advancements it might 
have produced. 
 Plans for modernization and reorganization often included an expansion of 
automation, and the use of computers to streamline decision-making and more 
accurately assess resources, schedules, and demand.
275
 Lack of computational or 
automated equipment meant that millions of economic decisions fell to an army of 
bureaucrats who were frequently disconnected from one another. As late as 1961, 
some Soviet economists still doubted that computer-based solutions such as 
cybernetics should be used in economic planning.
276
  
 According to Soviet economist V.D. Belkin, cybernetics and automation 
were especially important and well-suited to socialism, because centrally-planned 
economies could employ such technologies more directly to production and stood 
to benefit more greatly, as opposed to the West, which employed them with an 
―absence of purposefulness.‖
277
 Without such innovations, the Soviet bureaucracy 
was becoming so notoriously out of hand that in 1967 Senator Karl Mundt 
referenced a 1962 quotation from P.N. Glushkov, Director of the Ukranian 
Institute of Cybernetics, before Congress in defense of strengthening export 
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controls: ―If present day methods do not change, by 1980 the entire adult 
population will be employed in administration.‖
278
 Keeping computing technology 
out of Soviet hands would weaken communism and neutralize whatever threat the 
USSR might pose militarily, technologically, or economically. 
 
“Science is a Unity” 
 
 ―Science and its applications in technology are exerting a 
revolutionary influence on the destinies of nations and mankind. Our 
domestic and foreign policies must be attuned to this revolution and 
to its implications of change in the pattern of world relationships... 
Science is a unity. Science is the inquiry into nature. Its limits are the 
universe and the capability of the human mind. It possesses unity, 




  --―International Scientific and Technological Activities‖,  
a report to the Federal Council for Science and Technology 
by its International Committee, June 20, 1961. 
  
 
  Due in part to the rising Soviet interest in cybernetics and computing, 
American computing innovators were able to build upon their research and 
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innovations in an unrestrained (and often well-funded) manner.
280
 The U.S. 
government saw a potential national security concern in the Soviet mania for 
cybernetics, and freed the resources and investments necessary to examine and 
assess the threat. It also saw its prestige and scientific advantage was at stake, and 
did not wish to be caught off guard by the Soviet Union as it had at the end of the 
1950s. The arms race and the space race were truly both part of one great 
technology race, one the U.S. did not intend to lose.
281
 
The advanced computing community within the U.S. was still a relatively 
small and well-connected community, and it was to this community that the CIA 
turned for their opinions on Soviet computing, specifically cybernetics. Future 
Nobel laureate in economics Herbert Simon, a leading artificial intelligence expert, 
was one member of the panel convened to assess the threat.282 Simon later 
recalled how ―the CIA had submitted a thick report to President Kennedy about an 
alleged 'great Soviet plot to conquer the world with cybernetics.'‖:  
 
―Alas, our panel was too honest. If we had reported 
back...that the Soviet cybernetics project was genuinely dangerous, 
American research in artificial intelligence would have had all the 
funding it could possibly use for years to come. Putting temptation 
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behind us, we reported that the CIA document was a fairy story — 




The refreshing honesty of this is remarkable, and speaks to the nature of the 
computing community within the United States and its relationship with the federal 
government. Gerovitch also notes that unlike the Soviet Union, where military 
computing was a highly guarded and secretive field, ―the US government 
facilitated the transfer of new technologies from the military sector into civilian 
economy by making them freely available and by providing 




Knowing the conditions under which Soviet military scientists worked, this 
level of trust between science and state was not something to be taken for granted. 
Freedom of and enthusiasm for communication among American computing 
experts also helped foster new developments. Upon hearing of the Soviet vogue for 
cybernetics, the founder of one of the earliest linked networks, MIT psychologist 
and later Kennedy advisor J.C.R. Licklider, sent a memo to members of his 
informal social network in 1963, urging them to standardize their systems so that 
data could be communicated from one system to another. ―Consider the situation in 
which several different centers are netted together‖, he wrote, arguing that it was 
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important ―to develop a capability for integrated network operation‖.
285
 In the 
U.S., the importance of compatibility had been realized and a network 
implemented through casual communication by the early 1960s. In the USSR, 
achieving something similar would require many years and the investment of 
multiple sectors of the economy, and yet yield few practical advances. 
Licklider recounted to Slava Gerovitch that Norbert Wiener, the father of 
cybernetics (and coiner of the term), ―ran a weekly circle of 40 or 50 people who 
got together. They would gather together and talk for a couple of hours,‖ at MIT, 
presumably about cybernetics and related computing work.
286
 There were few 
barriers between the ideas shared casually at MIT and those born at Harvard, the 
Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, federal agencies such as NASA and 
DARPA, and numerous corporate labs across the United States. These scientists 
came from a variety of fields, brought a range of perspectives to a single problem, 
and had the physical resources to test their theories, and the professional and 
financial motivation to put to them to best use. Feedback from experimental 
studies, applied automation in industry and business figures regarding the 
performance of computer models was readily available and subject to analysis.
287
 
Besides the fact that technical documentation was scarce and carefully guarded, 
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accurate statistics of any kind were almost impossible to come by in the USSR.
288
 
It is difficult to imagine such fruitful conversations having taken place among 
scientists in a single room anywhere in the Soviet Union, much less among groups 
of researchers spread across vast distances, various fields and sectors of the 
economy. 
 
 Early on, the U.S. perceived that stymieing computing research in the USSR 
would greatly weaken its adversary's ability to compete on the world stage, and 
that it was also necessary to support similar computing efforts within the United 
States.
289 
In 1961, a reviewer of the Soviet volume Cybernetics in the Service of 
Communism posited that cybernetics ―may be one of the weapons Khrushchev had 
in mind when he threatened to ―bury‖ the West.‖
290
 This was a call to action 
within the U.S., and attracted not only the interest of America's best minds, but 
ample funding in the interest of national security. As Gerovitch observes, ―The 
priorities of the US government...were dictated by the Cold War, and it funded, 
through the Department of Defense and other agencies, a wide range of computer 
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initiatives, including the first packet-switching network, the ARPANET.‖
291
 ―This 
story is profoundly ironic: America rejected cybernetics but implemented the 
cybernetic vision, while the Soviet Union did just the opposite: it paid lip service 




 Aside from the military and technological vulnerability lack of adequate 
computing resources created, economically it resulted in constant shortages, 
backups and hoarding. The grey market that emerged to fill gaps in the official 
economy had by the late 1960s become entrenched, and its patterns increasingly 
difficult to break. It was hoped that computers would eliminate loopholes and 
graft, and allow central planning to account for misdirected and inadequate 
resources.
293
 At this critical moment, a new generation of young economists 
heavily influenced by Western models began to exercise influence over Kremlin 
policymakers. While not reformers in a strict sense, in their view growth was 
created by encouraging efficient management and scientific innovation, and in 
order to achieve the planned reforms, and develop the consumer goods and 
agricultural sectors, resource planning and market research would need to be 
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 The resurgence of cybernetics, once a science in disgrace, was owed 
in part to the conclusions of younger economists on the model of Western-
Influenced Dzherman Gvishiani.
295
 Their economic ideologies often departed from 
traditional Marxist-Leninist ideology and ethics, instead embracing utilitarian 
efficiency; Nikolai Shmelev, a reformist economist himself, described the 
worldview of state economists in late 1960‘s as ―anything that is economically 
efficient is moral‖.
296
 By the late 1960s, no newly uncovered opinion of Lenin was 
required to sanction the idea that socialist construction and ethics could come 
second to economic concerns. 
 
 Even after the initial vogue for cybernetics began to fade, the call for 
advancements in computing came louder than ever from economic planners.
297
 
And yet the academic and industrial communities were apparently not prepared to 
embrace and support such efforts. The head of the Academy of Sciences, Mstislav 
Keldysh, noted in 1967 ―It seems to me that the psychological change connected 
with the application of computer technology is taking place among us very slowly. 
















Therefore, its propaganda [popularization] has great significance.‖
298
 Propaganda, 
however, could only take computing so far; cybernetics had become an impressive 
buzzword, to the point where even Gvishiani himself complained of having to 
include it in the title of his book in order to attract interest, but little physical 
support materialized for domestic computing research efforts.
299
 
 As the 1960s wore on, it was becoming clear that it would be nearly 
impossible for the USSR to match the astounding success of computing technology 
as it was developing in the West. The proliferation of smaller, more flexible 
systems affected every segment of the American economy by the mid-1960s, and 
the near-universal adoption of automation by American business seemed 
imminent.
300
 The automated and fully accountable economy that Lenin had 
envisioned was far closer to reality in the United States than in the Soviet Union by 
1967. These were market-driven changes in the West; for the USSR to achieve the 
same result through central planning would be the ultimate test of socialism.   
  
 In 1965, the State Committee for the Coordination for Scientific Research 
established in 1961 was rechristened the State Committee on Science and Technology. 
The primary difference was that the SCST more discretely separated its administrative 
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oversight of basic research from that of technological applied research, but the SCST 
still demonstrated the state's commitment to planning the progress of both from the top 
down.
301
 At the helm were the influential V.A. Kirillin (later a deputy chairman of the 
Council of Ministers), and economist Dzherman Gvishiani, both of whom favored 
increased trade with the West.
302 
These economic opinions were bolstered by the 
support of men like Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, who to a certain extent carried 
Khrushchev's legacy of reform into the Brezhnev era. In 1966, Kosygin addressed the 
Twenty-Third Party Congress with the following: 
 ―Heretofore, we have underestimated the importance of trade 
in patents and licenses. At the same time, throughout the world such 
trade is playing an increasingly noticeable role and is developing 
more rapidly than the trade in manufactured goods. Our scientific and 
technical personnel are capable of creating-- this has been proven in 
practice-- advanced machinery and equipment. Therefore, we can and 
should hold a worthy place on the world license market. In turn, in a 
number of cases it is more profitable for us to purchase a license than 
to work on the resolution of a given problem. During the new five-
year plan, the purchase of patent rights abroad will make it possible to 




 Another feature of the SCST was its access to a reserve fund and special 
supplies for distribution to projects of special importance. ―The SCST approves 
research plans, allocates money, and checks on the results of engineering research 
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conducted by the USSR Academy of Sciences, the local academies of science in the 
Soviet republics, and research institutes in industry, medicine, and agriculture. Before 
the creation of the SCST, the glavki were required by the council of ministers to 
reduce production costs in its enterprises by a certain percentage, which was often 
translated by the minister's technical staff into orders to introduce small-scale 
innovation capable of greater efficiency. But the SCST was empowered to aid in the 
replacement of old production processes with entirely new technologies, concentrating 
on radical, large-scale innovation.‖
304
 This approach would rival acquisition of 
foreign licenses in its impact on the future direction of civilian computing research in 
the USSR. 
 ―The All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information,‖ the 
―Institute of Problems of Control,‖ and the ―All-Union Information Center‖ focus 
their efforts on ―the flow of information from basic to applied science.‖
305
 
However, the bureaucratic hurdles these agencies erected, and the cost-saving 
policies they recommended (such as long amortization schedules for state-
produced machinery) were reflected in their material impact, which was that 
―...new equipment was frequently described as inefficient or even less economical 
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than the machinery it replaced.‖
306
 Even as increasing resources were thrown 
behind domestic efforts in the development of computers, the administration and 
control seemed to self-sabotage at every step. 
  
 East-West trade had been steadily increasing for nearly a decade at this 
point. In 1967, combined trade between Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland and Rumania amounted to 177 million dollars in imports and 195 
million dollars in exports from the US.
307
 This is not to mention the healthy 
business being done between other non-communist states and Eastern Europe. 
Total East-West trade for 1967, between Eastern Europe and non-communist 
nations (including Japan), was over 15 billion US dollars. Even though East-West 
trade accounted for only 0.7% of total US trade in that year, the balance of trade 
was tilted firmly in the West's favor, and as Eastern Europe's economies stagnated, 




 Resistance to trade with Eastern Europe within the US legislature continued 
throughout this period, concurrent with the escalation of the situation in Vietnam. 
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Numerous unions, citizens' groups, and local governments participated in boycotts 
and picketing throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
309
 Several localities passed 
―Communist Goods Ordinances‖, forcing merchants to purchase municipal licenses 
in order to sell products produced in socialist countries, and at times post signs on 
their premises loudly advertising that the owners did business with communists. 
These ordinances were typically enforced with fines or even threat of 
imprisonment. However, challenges to the ―Communist Goods Ordinances‖ 
typically led to the law being overturned as unconstitutional.
310
 Still, the passing of 
such ordinances revealed significant opposition to trade between socialist 
governments and American businesses when the goods in question were Czech 
glassware and Yugoslav coat hangers. When potentially strategic items such as 
computers were slated for export, concern over such an exchange came from a 
much broader cross-section of American society.
311
 Nonetheless, trade with 
Eastern Europe was too profitable a business and too useful a diplomatic tool to go 
unexploited, especially Soviet control over its former satellites seemed to be 
slipping, and global tensions shifting towards Asia. 
 












 Given encouraging signs from the Johnson Administration throughout the 
mid-1960s, the Soviet Union had every reason to believe it will have steadily 
increasing access to Western technology. In 1966, to accompany Soviet economic 
reforms, it is determined that a series of compatible, scalable computers should be 
developed.
312
 While there had been ongoing debate about the best methods for 
developing a series of compatible systems, the suggestion of working from 
successful Western models had gained support as signs of trade liberalization 
increased. Some computing specialists within the USSR were not opposed to a 
collaborative approach; Mikhail Sulim of the Ministry of Radio-Engineering 
Industry and Communications had been engaged in negotiations with West German 
computing firm Siemens and British firm ICL in 1966.
313
 However, the Council of 
Ministers, impressed with the successes of the IBM 360, chose this as their desired 
model, even though IBM was not a willing collaborator.
314
 However, IBM's push 
to sell computers in Eastern Europe, despite protests within the U.S., may have 
been viewed as a positive sign. 
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 By 1967, IBM had sold versions of its 1400 Series to Bulgaria, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and was planning a controversial sale of one of its 
360 Series to East Germany the following year.
315
 Word of the sale and pressure 
from citizens' groups within the U.S. led to introduction of a Congressional 
resolution that the United States government should cease purchasing computers 
from companies making computer sales to communist nations. External pressure 
on the part of the same citizens groups and elected officials had derailed an 
arrangement between the American Motor Company and the Soviet Union in 1967, 
but IBM refused to yield, eventually winning out on the sale.
316
 The growing 
determination of Western firms to sell such technologies in Eastern Europe could 
only be viewed as a positive sign by the USSR.  
  
 The steadily increasing access to Western technology enjoyed by the 
USSR's Eastern European allies, and the promise that such access would continue 
to improve, likely made the comparatively expensive and often fruitless process of 
developing domestic computer models economically unappealing. Why should the 
USSR invest so heavily in projects that produced computers that would only be 
immediately superseded if an Eastern Bloc nation were able to purchase a Western 
model? Regardless of the promise of domestic computing research, if the USSR 
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and its COMECON associates were to undertake the rapid conversion of the 
economy envisioned by its central planners, time was of the essence. All avenues 




 Acquisition of IBM machines and production lines would be achieved by 
cooperation with the USSR's COMECON allies: 
 "The idea behind the joint program was not just to pool all 
the national resources in the region, but also to get different 
countries to buy different pieces of computer technology from the 
West. The Soviet Union was interested in this cooperation only 
partly in order to save on the costs of Western imports. More 
importantly, it expected the East Europeans to obtain those 
technologies which Soviet industry, the prime target of Western 





 However, the resources dedicated to purchasing these foreign models did 
not necessarily include the efforts required to redevelop and integrate them, or train 
sufficient personnel in their use. In retrospect, given the practical conceptions of 
computers in the USSR, and the dominant linear notions of economic development, 
it is not surprising that these vital aspects of applied innovation were not 
adequately accounted for. Economist David Dyker describes the failure of the 
system as follows; 
  "Whereas the Fordist technologies transferred, with 
substantial success, during the earlier period of socialist 









development were generally amenable to 'arms-length' technology 
transfer procedures (purchases of licenses and manuals, reverse 
engineering, etc.) transfer of the post-Fordist technologies of the 
1970s and 1980s demanded a completely different approach. In a 
situation where 'tacit' knowledge, not readily transferable except 
within very tightly-knit groups, took on an ever greater importance 
and where 'hands-on' contact took on and an increasingly important 
role at the more practical end of the technology transfer process, the 




 The Soviet computing industry had suffered not only because of cutbacks in 
support for science as a whole, but because of the nature of the Soviet economy, 
and now vast sums were to be spent, directly or indirectly, for foreign innovations 





―The final government decision was made in favor of the second 
variant and it still remains the most disputable moment in Soviet 
computer history.‖ 
--B.N. Malinovsky, Akademician of the Ukrainian 





                                                          
 
319
David Dyker. Catching Up and Falling Behind: Post-Communist Transformation in Historical 
Perspective, (London: Imperial College Press, 2004), p.22 
 
320
Fitzpatrick, Anne. Pioneers of Soviet Computing. (e-book) http://sovietcomputing.com, Ch.6 
127 
 
 On December 30, 1967 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the 
Council of Ministers passed Resolution No. 1180/420, an order intended to create a 
string of computer collectives to produce machines that would be seamlessly 
integrated across all areas of the economy and building up a profitable technology 
industry.
321
 This would be accomplished by complete dedication of Soviet 
scientific resources, but the resolution also made allowances for the importation of 
Western technology and expertise. It acknowledged that its goals could not be 
reached without legal contracts for purchase of equipment manufactured abroad, 
and diverted focus from domestic research.
322
 This would become known as the 
―make-or-take‖ decision, and it was not reached without controversy. The USSR 
had essentially tied the fate of one of its most important industries to the global 
capitalism it purportedly sought to destroy.  
 
 The decision to adopt foreign models instead of investing heavily in 
domestic R&D was made on the basis of practicality and cost-effectiveness, at the 
expense of the socialist ideal. This approach toward efficiency represented a break 
with the past. In this sense, the economic planners found themselves in direct 
conflict with many scientists, not only for their perceived drift from orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism, but also for the lack of confidence it demonstrated in 
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 For some, the make-or-take decision would prove to 
be the final insult after numerous slights on the part of the Council of Ministers; 




 Besides the cost and inefficiency of purchasing foreign licenses, obtaining 
validation from COCOM for said licenses often required submitting to certain 
conditions set forth by the manufacturer or their government. The firs t set of 
standard safeguards for a foreign computer was developed in response to the sale 
of a large British-made computer to the USSR in 1949.
325
 These might include 
certain limits on the capacity of the model to be shipped, restrictions on the 
location and method of its use, a requirement that the Soviet plant or agency 
provide regular reports on the use of processor time, and in some cases provisions 
for actual personnel trained by the manufacturer to work on site. Such personnel 
might offer training and to assure proper operation of the machine, but would also 
track spare parts requested and provide constant surveillance of usage and records 
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for an indefinite period.
326
  By requesting foreign computers, the USSR had 
invited foreign supervision of the most direct kind. 
 
 With Brezhnev's power fully established, the year 1967 saw a renewed 
conservatism emanating from Moscow, and with it the renewed repression of 
dissidence in the scientific community.
327
 This reactionary process had begun with 
Khrushchev's fall, when Party organizations within scientific institutes began 
holding lectures to counter ―the influence of bourgeois ideology‖.
328
 By 1967, the 
increasing boldness of dissident scientists like Andrei Sakharov had reached its 
limits, resulting in a wave of much more forcible censorship.
329
 In what had 
previously been a surprisingly liberal atmosphere where academies had relative 
freedom in their selection of seminar speakers (even controversial samizdat 
writers), ―the Sovetsky raikom took over the management of the seminars in 
Akademgorodok, setting the topics for discussion and giving recommendations on 
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how they should be run.‖
330
 In such an atmosphere, it is less surprising that the 
research community did not launch a somewhat more vociferous protest of 
Resolution No. 1180/420. 
 The military, which oversaw a great deal of computing research in the 
USSR, was also staunchly opposed to working from foreign models, seeing it as a 
security risk as well as a disgrace to Soviet pride.
331
 The military‘s projects were 
closely guarded and its structures especially rigid, and the decision to use foreign 
models as templates drove military computing deeper into secrecy, and further 
from the mainstream of computing research.
332
 Nonetheless, since its research and 
funding were considered separately from that of non-military computing, the 
decision to embrace foreign models for economic planning and industrial 




 Scientists were becoming more sharply divided into ―military‖ and 
―civilian‖ groups, the former often enjoying greater resources, but in ever greater 
isolation, a problem the state was both aware of and yet unable to rectify, given the 
                                                          
 
330
Stephen Fortescue, The Communist Party and Soviet Science. (London: Macmillan, 1986), p.126. 
 
331









fear of communication its own policies engendered.
334
 The terms of state secrecy 
were laid out in intensely specific terms, and violations were punishable by harsh 
sentences.
335
 Leonid Vladimirov, an engineer-journalist who defected to the U.S. 
in 1966 described how ―...Soviet specialists work in a state of really fr ightful 
isolation, not only from the outside world, but from other Soviet industrial plants 
and research establishments...The fear of ―giving away‖ something secret keeps the 
lips sealed even of those scientists who are working on non-secret 
subjects...Because of this the bogey of secrecy holds up the progress of non-secret 
scientific work as well.‖
336
 Nowhere was secrecy more a priority than in military 
research, which may explain why a number of the most advanced programs were 
run by the military, yet some computers in use by the Red Army were still reliant 




 Dr. Sergei Lebedev, one of the foremost researchers in computing during 
the discipline‘s founding years in the USSR, staunchly opposed the importation of 
foreign technology. A lifelong Slavophile and isolationist, he believed that the 
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USSR must make its own path in this field.
338
 On the other hand, the heads of 
several influential and relatively reform-minded institutes, including Georgy 
Arbatov of the USA Institute, Oleg Bogomolov of IEMSS and Nikolai Inozemtsev 
of IMEMO reflected a powerful interest in speeding the development of the 
technology sector in the USSR.
339
 However, Mikhail Sulim, Deputy Minister of 
the Radio Industry, staunchly opposed the decision to import Western technology, 
correctly fearing that domestic development would shortly be abandoned 
entirely.
340
 A number of computing researchers left the field in response to the 
―make-or-take‖ decision, as in time they saw more and more funding for their 
independent research cut.
341
 Sulim later lost out in a second argument over 
whether or not a foreign model should be the basis for the planned Edinnaia 
(Unified) System, the first compatible series of computers produced by the USSR 
and its allies.  Sulim resigned his position in 1970, partly because the IBM360 
was selected as the basis of the Unified System even after he had warned it was 
















already dismally obsolete. Sulim later was quoted as having said, ―I have to say 





Trade Liberalization and U.S. Foreign Policy  
 
 ―The intimate engagement of trade, over a considerable period 
of time, when taken with the process of change already underway, can 
influence the internal development and the external policies of 
European Communist societies along paths favorable to our purpose 
and to world peace. Trade is one of the few channels available to us for 
constructive contacts with nations with whom we find frequent 
hostility. In the long run, selected trade, intelligently negotiated and 
wisely administered, may turn out to have been one of our most 
powerful tools of national policy.‖ 
--Hearings from Miller Committee, United States Trade Relations 
with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union, 1968 
Hearings, p. 793  
 
―When the time comes to hang the capitalist class, they will  
compete with each other to sell us the rope.‖ 




 The violent oppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 produced a sharp but 
temporary reversal in support for increased trade to Eastern Europe; at the same time, 
the new Republican administration under Nixon took an initial hard line against trade 
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 However, the actions of the USSR also served to cement 
the perception of Eastern Europe as an unwilling thrall to Soviet power, and perhaps 
engendering a measure of what might be called 'subversive goodwill'. Assisting the 
nations of Eastern Europe in developing their own economic identities would draw 
them away from dependence and alignment with the Soviet Union, a valuable long-




 American business continued to press against restrictive controls in 1968, 
arguing that they did little to prevent strategic items out of socialist hands and merely 
excluded US businesses from the international marketplace.
346
 Even after the 1966 
amendments and 1967 concessions, in 1968 American control lists included 1300 
categories not covered by COCOM restrictions, including 1100 items readily available 
to Eastern Europe through America's European allies.
347
 Beyond the restrictions 
imposed by COCOM, the United States had its own system of controls based on 
several pieces of Cold War legislation. The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 gave the 
U.S. Patent Office authority to determine whether a piece of technology was 
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dangerous enough to be officially classified, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
further defined "restricted data" that might be too dangerous to be freely circulated.
348
 
Once the United States was perceived to have acquiesced to the demands of its NATO 
allies on East-West technology transfer, internal pressure from American businesses 
became harder to resist. The need for further COCOM review and further pressure for 
trade liberalization was now compounded by the fact that foreign models had become 





 In 1968, in response to escalating hostilities in Vietnam and the violent Soviet 
reaction in Czechoslovakia, the State Department suggested a special panel be 
established within the Economic Defense Advisory Committee to review difficult 
COCOM cases in the area of digital computers. Such a panel would include 
representatives from the Department of Defense, CIA, Army Environmental 
Command, NASA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Treasury and Commerce 
Departments, in addition to representatives from the Bureau of Intelligence and 
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 This broad, largely militaristic and intensely bureaucratic approach 
toward export control on the part of the United States threatened to slow an already 
unwieldy process. The United States was determined not to allow the transfer of 
technology to socialist countries to become the status quo. However, balancing the 
interests of the U.S. with those of its allies would be an ongoing process if the system 
of export controls was to persist at all.  
  According to Abraham Katz, Director of the Office of OECD, European 
Communities and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs in the State Department (1967-
74), the slow U.S. response to licensing requests was trying the patience of other 
COCOM members; "There has been a real failure on the part of the US in dealing with 
'exception' cases. Some of these, currently awaiting US reply, have been pending since 
last year."
351
 Katz encouraged his associate, Joseph Greenwald, to remind the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense that "COCOM is a voluntary organization", and that its 
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 As the situation in Vietnam worsened, the U.S. attempted to retreat to its 
traditional embargo strategy, becoming increasingly restrictive.
353
 These tensions 
placed tremendous stress on its relations with other COCOM members. Katz advised 
that "We must give to get, be prepared to yield old controls to add new ones." An 
updated embargo list would include some American demands, especially tighter 
controls on computers and special machine tools, but sharply reduce the number of 
―strategic‖ items requiring validated licenses. 
354
  
 While a more liberal approach to technology exchange might have appealed to 
many in the US on a philosophical level, the need to balance America's foreign 
interests played a more practical role in the occasional laxity shown toward controls in 
Eastern Europe. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon 
suggested some talking points concerning the 1968-69 COCOM list review:  
"We see the objectives of the COCOM negotiations as being 
twofold: a) to update the list from a technical standpoint, and b) to 
assure the continuation of adequate controls towards Communist 
China. We realize that this means the deletion of many exceptions for 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe...This year we are trying to 
confine most of the relaxation to Eastern Europe so that controls can 
be maintained or strengthened towards Communist China." 
355
  
                                                          
 
353
Saville Davis, ―Patterns and Problems in U.S. Foreign Policy,‖ International Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 4, 






―Review of the International Embargo List in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM),‖ from 
Anthony Solomon, November 11, 1968. National Archives and Records Administration, 





 In satisfying Western Europe by relaxing restrictions on Eastern Europe in 
exchange for cooperation on strengthening the embargo towards China, COCOM 
inevitably incurred tensions with the Japanese, for whom heightened restrictions on 
Chinese trade were a major disadvantage. In subsequent decades, as computers 




 The State Department engaged in a long, arduous negotiation process with 
COCOM members regarding reform of the Embargo List. Anthony Solomon wrote of 
the ongoing COCOM embargo list negotiations, "We have had frank discussions with 
the British on the control of digital computers. They have rejected US proposals to 
strengthen computer controls (now exportable by member countries on the basis of 
unilateral administrative interpretations)....The British position is that the present list is 
out of date politically and technically and that a drastic pruning is long overdue."
357
 
Given that many licenses were ultimately approved, and that American businesses 
faced more hurdles than anyone else in selling items readily available elsewhere, 
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 In 1969, a newly amended Export Administration Act essentially declared 
American intentions of increasing trade with Eastern Europe. Broader powers to 
determine if export of strategic goods endangers national security or interest would 
rest with the president, giving the executive branch greater leverage in foreign 
policy.
359
 Items freely available from American allies would be cleared for licensing 
by the Department of Commerce except in special cases, and justification for denial of 
the license would be required in the Department's quarterly report.
360
  
 The Act included more provisions for updating and revision of control lists, 
and efforts to increase transparency on the part of the US and involvement on the part 
of the potential purchasers of restricted items, including the opportunity to make their 
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 The Export Administration Act also provided a basis in law for businesses 
embroiled in contract or labor disputes.
362
  The Act reduced the effects of judicial 
reluctance in local and federal courts to grant relief to businesses engaging in trade 
with socialist countries. Federal law now made it clear that private efforts to boycott or 




 This acknowledgement by the Unites States government also provided some 
cover for American businesses which feared public disapproval of their business 
dealings with the socialist world. Senator Walter Mondale issued the following 
comments on the Export Administration Act before Congress in 1969:   
 ―It is important by virtue of its own terms. But it may be that its 
symbolism is even more important, because, for years, deeply patriotic 
U.S. businessmen, seeking to sell peaceful, nonstrategic items to 
Eastern Europe have been subject to the charge that there is something 
wrong with their patriotism, even though they knew that such efforts 
were in this Nation's best interests ....Repeatedly, throughout this act, 
we have declared it to be the policy of the United States to support such 




 Senator Edward Brooke also cited the diplomatic latitude the Act provided for 
the executive branch; ―The central point is that, if the opportunity does arise for the 









―The Export Administration Act‖ speech by Senator Walter Mondale, December 23, 1969, 115 
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President to establish more fruitful trading relationships with one or more members of 
the Soviet bloc, the bill will enable the United States to do so.‖
365
 This approach to 
export controls in Eastern Europe did not equate to a 'normalized' relationship with the 
socialist world, but allowed for more strategic crafting of policies and procedures by 
moving from an implied state of constant embargo to one where functional 
relationships and true diplomacy might take root. 
 
A Rock and a Hard Place 
 
―Integrating computing into a large national economy is not like 
building army tanks. Users must have the motivation to go through all 
the trouble that is involved in learning to apply this technology 
effectively. They also need a great deal of help.‖ 
 --Seymour Goodman, Professor of International Affairs  




 Developing the Soviet computer industry by reverse-engineering Western 
models would perhaps be more difficult than the Council of Ministers had assumed.  
The USSR had placed itself in the uncomfortable position of waiting years for the 
approval of licenses, which might be dependent on its ―good behavior‖ in the political 
arena, in order to obtain outdated computers at absurdly inflated prices. It would then 
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attempt to recreate these machines using domestic research, development and 
production capacity and that of the other COMECON member states.
367
 
 While the practicality of purchasing foreign licenses often appealed to 
economic planners, and in theory to managers within production sectors, in reality 
there were a number of negative attitudes towards computing technology that would 
hinder their adoption and effective use.
368
 These would manifest in a resistance to the 
introduction of new machines into manufacturing, business and educational 
environments. It has already been mentioned that within academia, some considered 
the computer a ―makeweight‖, and thus proper priority was not given to the study of 




 Purchase of licenses, while sensible from a financial and efficiency 
perspective, also struck a painful chord for many Soviet managers as well as 
researchers, an awareness that Soviet exceptionalism was not, in fact, immutable.
370
 
This likely engendered the defensiveness perceived by economist E. Artimiev: 
 ―There are many shortcomings in the work connected with the 
purchase of licenses. Considerations of prestige often take precedence 
over economics. The directors of a number of organizations and 
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enterprises frequently regard the decision to buy a foreign license as a 
mark of their own scientific and technical incompetence and as a slur 
on the honor of their department. That is why a certain percentage of 
them strive to solve every new scientific and technical problem with 
their own resources, which leads to an unjustified proliferation of 
research topics, the scattering of funds and a considerable delay in the 




 At times, industries made only partial use of their licenses, feeling some 
obligation to do at least some portion of the work themselves, or to save money after 
purchasing the expensive license: ―...Soviet industrial officials sometimes insist on 
buying unpackaged technology from the West, and supplying part of the technology 
from their own resources in order to economize on hard currency expenditures. This 




 Besides responding to the very real threat of force from the Soviet Union, 
among the advantages Eastern Europe gained from cooperation with the USSR was 
the provision of subsidized raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods. One 
development in this longstanding arrangement was that by the 1970s, many of the 
COMECON member countries had long-term agreements in place with the USSR 
promising Western technology in exchange for raw materials such as oil, coal and 
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 Subsequent sale of these raw materials provided valuable hard currency 
with which to purchase more goods and licenses from abroad.
374
 A thriving black 
market in computer components and intelligence existed within Eastern Europe, the 
USSR and third-party states not covered by COCOM; illicit exchanges within the 
socialist world might have perhaps even overshadowed the much-examined illicit 
acquisition of technology from the West.
375
 Not every advantage or failure of Eastern 
European industry was revealed to the USSR or to the public; Central and Eastern 
Europe had long honed the practice of "creating fictions to please authorities", whether 
that meant fudging statistics, to fabrication of industrial committees and other 
entities.
376
 In this way, Eastern Europe attempted to leverage whatever hard currency 
it could obtain, and maximize the profits from whatever technology it could import.  
 
 Regardless of whether models originated at home or abroad, Soviet 
researchers could not simply request components to test their theories; the entirety 
of the elaborate Soviet command system had to be consulted before production of 
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this kind could take place, and such requests were often turned down.
377
 One goal 
of Resolution No. 1180/420 was the production of microchips, an industry that was 
practically nonexistent in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s. Another was the 
increase in the number of mainframe units and small to mid-range computers for 
use in government and industry, and for sale to Soviet allies abroad. From 1966-
1970, the USSR produced 5,800 computers. The goal for 1971-1975 was 20,000, a 
level that was not attained until the late 1970s.
378
 By contrast, in 1967 the IBM 
Corporation was installing over 1,200 units of its System/360 each month.379 The 
production of a single model by private industry in the United States vastly 
outstripped even the loftiest Soviet expectations for its own manufacturers.  
 Compatibility was among the chief attractions of the IBM models, a 
feature that the Soviet government would require computers to possess if they were 
to maximize their impact. The first Soviet effort to develop an upwardly 
compatible (stackable) computer was the Ural-10 in 1965. The Ural-10 suffered 
from poor design and hardware issues, and fewer than 1,000 were produced.
380
   









―Telex v. IBM: Implications for the Businessman and the Computer Manufacturer,‖ Virginia Law 






At the same time, IBM was experiencing tremendous success with its new 
System/360, which led to its selection as the working model for the future Unified 
Series. Another reason for its selection was the successful licensing agreement 
struck by the German Democratic Republic. The GDR began its first efforts in 
adopting international standards using the System/360 as a model in 1966.
381
 
According to 1967 COCOM regulations, any CPU with a bus rate of 40 or above, 
or a specially-calculated COCOM processing rate of 8 or above would be denied 
export license. Only the smallest model of the IBM 360 series fit these 
qualifications, and this was the model in use in East Germany.
382
 In 1966, the 
USSR attempted to adopt the System/360s instruction set when designing the M-
2000, the first Soviet effort to copy a Western system for purposes of 




 Soviet computers, produced at a range of facilities scattered across a vast 
continent, were frequently incompatible with one another or with available 
peripherals despite efforts to build compatible systems.
384
 The military was by far 
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the largest investor in computing research, but the highly classified efforts relating 
to military computing and the atomized community of scientists working on them 
produced a tangle of computer models, platforms and hardware, few of which were 
compatible with any other machine.
385
  
―Many military control systems based on mobile computers 
were aimed at small-scale (separate specimens, tens or hundreds of 
pieces) production and use. Therefore, programmers made use of 
ingenious designs and ignored hardware and software unification 
and standardization. Consumers did not coordinate the specifications 
for computer aids, each of which had to be individually adjusted to 
consumer‘s tasks. Hence there emerged a real "zoo" of different 
computers and software complexes often solving the very same 




It would be remarkable if this situation did not negatively impact Soviet 
military readiness, but given the secrecy surrounding these machines, their use and 
development, the frequency of problems caused by incompatible systems will 
likely remain unknown. 
 
 The expense of relying on foreign technology became an integrated part of the 
Soviet economy by the 1970s; it is estimated that ten to twelve percent of Soviet 
investment during that decade went toward imported technology.
387
 The year 1967 
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would prove to be the last in which the USSR had a positive balance of trade with the 
West; between 1968 and 1975, the hard currency trade deficit of the USSR grew from 
US $109 million to over $6.2 billion.
388
  
 Eastern Europe also found itself deeply in debt owing to the unfulfilled 
promise of costly Western technology. Charles Maier, writing on the stagnation and 
decline of East Germany in the 1970s, describes the vicious cycle that developed in 
Eastern Europe: 
  "Accelerating inflation and the glut of dollar reserves in 
Europe that accumulated during the 1970s made it easy for Western 
banks to extend credits, whether in Latin America on the part of North 
American banks or in Poland and East Germany on the part of West 





 The initial victory of successfully securing licenses and business deals with the 
West soon yielded to bitter disappointment and increasing desperation within the 
Eastern Bloc. The only markets for COMECON-built computer were within 
COMECON itself, with some limited sales to underdeveloped nations, and a scant few 
elsewhere. During the 1970s, Bulgaria constructed twelve computer production plants 
equipped with Western machinery, and the output of these plants was sold almost 
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exclusively to the Soviet Union.
390
 Since many COMECON trade deals were 
conducted with an exchange of goods, it is entirely possible that the USSR paid for 
many of these computers with raw materials such as oil or coal, which then stood an 
excellent chance of being sold for hard currency, and this hard currency in turn used to 
purchase more technology from the West, and the cycle began anew.
391
  
 During the oil crises of the early 1970s, the USSR restricted the subsidized oil 
sales that had funded hard currency transactions and had allowed CMEA nations to 
cover the interest on their growing debts to the West. The pattern of behavior in terms 
of technology imports and acceptance of Western credits continued although Eastern 
Europe's ability to make good on these loans had been sharply restricted. The gap 
grew, and the Bloc's ability to catch up became an ever more distant possibility.
392
 
―Immediately following its collapse in 1991, it was revealed that CMEA's member 




 According to Marshall Goldman, ―For the Russians, imports are primarily a 
way of compensating for innovational shortcomings. Therefore, when the United 
                                                          
 
390









Gabor Hunya, ed. ―Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe and in the Newly Independent 
States‖, in The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies Yearbook 5. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994), p.33 
150 
 
States withheld a particular item such as titanium, this usually had only short-run 
impact, because sooner or later the U.S.S.R. would find substitutes or local supplies, 
although at a higher price. When, however, the U.S. sought to prevent the sale of 
technology, this often had a long-term effect on Soviet growth.‖
394
 The USSR held 
self-sufficiency as a goal for much of its initial period of industrial development; in 
many respects it came close to near-perfect subsistence. However, it continued to 
import foreign industrial designs, and never fully developed the capacity to produce all 
the innovations required to make technological progress across multiple sectors of its 
economy. It may be true that no state can reliably produce innovation in isolation; in 
this regard the political and economic isolation of the USSR compounded its internal 
institutional and social isolation, and contributed to its heightened dependence on 
foreign advances. 
 
 Among other issues holding back socialist integration of computing was the 
inflexibility of the educational and employment systems. Maier defines the problem in 
terms of central planning: "One does not simply move workers from hewing coal or 
rolling plate to assembling microchips....For decades socialism had pursued the 
romance of coal and steel without calculating the opportunities forgone in other 






activities....The system depended on more muscle and more people to bend more steel- 
not on ingenious breakthroughs."
395
  
Economist Olivier Bertrand points to the root of the problem in the way these 
societies poorly prepared their members to respond to social and technological 
changes; "Flexibility and responsiveness of educational and training systems are often 
seen as the best response to change and uncertainty. They are often associated with 
decentralization at the regional, local, and/or school level and they require more 
cooperation with enterprises and local authorities."
396
 This suggestion is supported by 
the revealing fact that while computer development was declared an economic and 
scientific priority of the highest order in the USSR by the late 1950s, the first courses 




 Beyond failure to prepare its research institutions and industries for 
technological change, the nature of social control under communism often rendered 
automation ineffectual for the most basic tasks. Until the late 1980s, processes that had 
become mundane in the West, such as photocopying, could only be done under strict 
supervision in the USSR. This was to prevent them from being co-opted by samizdat 
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publishers hoping to subvert state censorship.
398
 Because of the nature of Soviet 
society, a small change to an airline booking system might require the signing off of 
three or four levels of management, thereby nullifying any improvements in efficiency 
the computer might have offered.
399
 While the key to IBM's success in the West had 
been effectiveness and impeccable service, any institution lucky enough to possess a 
computer at all in the socialist world would likely find that the machine spent much of 
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  We can look back on the Soviet example and countless others that seem to 
demonstrate that intellectual freedom and dedicated investment are both prerequisites 
for innovation to have a positive social impact. Innovation is most readily translated 
into advancement when it is able to grow and develop in ways that suit the actual 
needs of society, and not a preconceived notion of what will be profitable or desirable. 
Just as "Technology is firm-specific, and external R&D cannot be a substitute for in-
house R&D,"
401
 innovation is society-specific, and cannot be substituted by foreign 
developments with complete success. It is possible that the costs of attempting to 
replace one with the other could consume any gains it allows, and the shortfalls in 
overall effectiveness will likely result in persistent net losses.  
The socialist world reached deep into its pockets for this technology, hoping 
that the next innovation would produce the kinds of solutions its struggling economies 
desperately needed. The evolving nature and administration of Western export 
controls created sufficient reason within the Soviet Union for it to alter its domestic 
science policy. This resulted in the abandonment of many domestic research and 
development efforts in favor of adaptation of foreign models. However, acquisition of 
foreign licenses and machines did not produce the social and economic benefits 
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anticipated largely due to the nature of economic and educational institutions within 
the USSR. Innovation without subsequent development and improvement, or effective 
education and adoption within society failed to produce economic benefits in 
proportion to their expense. For reasons of ideology and politics, and despite 
significant effort the Soviet state failed to develop structures that could effectively 
exploit its native talent for broad social and economic ends. Its model of scientific 
progress did not fully account for the fact that research and development often do not 
produce their greatest results along purely pragmatic lines. The Soviet Union sought 
perfect order in computing; despite the order implied by elegant algorithms and 
precise technology, history tells us that the realities of innovation are far too unruly to 
be subject to human command. By maintaining control over sales of high technology 
to the communist world, the capitalist West reinforced the isolation and privation that 
had kept Soviet research efforts from succeeding; both tightened and relaxed controls 
were calculated to serve Western political aims as well. The Soviet Union attempted 
purchase the advancements of its stronger adversaries effort to compensate for a host 
of internal flaws; by leveraging the West‘s political and technological advantages, 
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